NYĀYA PHILOSOPHY

Literal Translation of

Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtra*

&

Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*

along with a free and abridged translation of the Elucidation by

Mahāmahopādhyāya Phaṇibhūṣaṇa Tarkavāgīśa

[PART V : FOURTH ADHYĀYA, SECOND ĀHNIKA]

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CHAPTER IV

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Adhyāya IV *Āhnika II*

1. On the production of right knowledge

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Is the right knowledge [of a person striving for liberation] produced in respect of each single one of as many as objects of valid knowledge there are [i. e. in respect of each one of the twelve objects of valid knowledge or *prameya*-s enumerated in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 9] ? Or, [is the right knowledge of a person striving for liberation] produced in respect of only some specific one [of such objects] ?

[Query to the objector] What is the difference here [i. e. between the two alternatives mentioned above] ? [The implication is : what is the difficulty in accepting either of the two alternatives ?] [Objector's explanation] [The right knowledge cannot be admitted to be] produced in respect of each single one of as many as objects of valid knowledge there are, because the objects of knowledge are innumerable. Nor [can the right knowledge be admitted to be] produced in respect of only some specific one, for in that case the ignorance

concerning the one in respect of which right knowledge has not been produced would not be destroyed and thus, there arises the absurdity of ignorance continuing as before due to the fact that the ignorance concerning one particular object cannot be removed by the right knowledge in respect of some other different object [Thus, neither of the alternatives can be accepted.]

[Vātsyāyana's answer] The objection does not hold, because ignorance means false knowledge, and not simply the non-production of right knowledge. Thus, [a person striving for liberation] is to acquire the right knowledge in respect of that specific object [i. e. *prameya*] the false knowledge continuing in respect of which becomes the root-cause of his [confinement to] worldly existence.

Elucidation -

In the opening *sūtra* of the *Nyāya-sūtra*, it has been stated that the right knowledge of the sixteen categories, from *pramāṇa* to *nigrahasthāna*, leads to liberation. However, of these sixteen categories, only the right knowledge of the second one—i. e. *prameya*—is the direct (*sākṣāt*) cause of liberation, and the right knowledge of the other fifteen categories is considered to be so only in an 'indirect way' (*paramparayā*), for it helps in the production of the right knowledge of the *prameya*-s and also guards the same. This implication has been conveyed by Gautama in the very second *sūtra* of his work (*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 2).

As against the above, it may be asked, what exactly is the meaning of the statement that the right knowledge of the *prameya*-s like the body etc. and the self is the cause of liberation ? Does it mean that a liberated person acquires the right knowledge of each and every one of the twelve *prameya*-s, i. e. of each and every individual body etc. and the self, or that a liberated person acquires the right knowledge of only a specific one of them ? Neither of the alternatives can be admitted logically, for the admission of any one of them would make liberation an impossibility. In the first alternative, liberation would be impossible, because one can never acquire the right knowledge of all the individual bodies and selves which are too numerous. In the second alternative also, liberation would be impossible, because even if one acquires the right knowledge of some specific body and self, one would remain ignorant about all the other bodies and selves etc. in respect of which no right knowledge has been produced, for the right knowledge of one object cannot remove the ignorance about another object. Therefore, how can one be said to be liberated, when one is bound to remain under so much ignorance ? In other words, the untenability of both these alternatives indicates that the right knowledge of the *prameya*-s cannot be accepted as the cause of liberation.

Answering the objection, Vātsyāyana says that ignorance means not simply an absence of right knowledge, but false knowledge which is the root-cause of one's confinement to worldly existence. One may have no right knowledge about some particular bodies or selves. But it does not necessarily mean that one has ignorance about them. Thus, a person striving for liberation should acquire the right knowledge of only that particular object the ignorance in respect of which makes him suffer and binds to worldly existence. In other words, every living being is subjected to worldly existence due to the ignorance about his own self and body etc. and, therefore, to attain liberation, he is to acquire the right knowledge of these alone and there is no necessity of his rightly knowing all the other bodies and selves. Thus, liberation would not be an impossibility, for it is possible to understand rightly the nature of one's own self and body etc. and remove the false knowledge thereof through the means like *śravaṇa*, *manana* etc. prescribed in the scripture.

The critical examination of the *prameya*-s has been completed in the first *āhnika* of this (fourth) *adhyāya*. What then is the utility of the present second *āhnika* ? To this, Udayana, in his *Tātparya-pariśuddhi*, answers that after the critical examination of the *prameya*-s it is necessary to examine critically the right knowledge of the *prameya*-s itself to dispel doubts as to what exactly is the nature of such knowledge, what is its object, how it is produced, how it is to be guarded, how it is to be enhanced and so on.

In his commentary on the *Tātparya-pariśuddhi*, Vardhamāna notes two objections against the critical examination of right knowledge here. First, in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, right knowledge has been neither 'preliminarily enumerated' (*uddiṣṭa*) nor defined (*lakṣita*) and hence, its critical examination is not justified. Secondly, there being no similarity in the subject-matter of the two *āhnika*-s they cannot combine themselves into one single *adhyāya*. In answer, Vardhamāna says that right knowledge has in fact been preliminarily enumerated and defined respectively in the very first and the second *sūtra*-s of the *Nyāya-sūtra*. Besides, in the first *āhnika*, Gautama has discussed six *prameya*-s which are all of the nature of an effect (*kārya*). Right knowledge which has been discussed in the second *āhnika* is also of the nature of an effect. Thus, there is similarity also in the subject-matter of the two *āhnika*-s.

Bhāṣya

What exactly is this false knowledge [which is said to be the cause of one's confinement to worldly existence] ? The notion of self in what is not self. To explain, [such false knowledge means] the 'erroneous notion' (*moha*) or the

'false idea concerning the self' (*ahaṃkāra*) in the form 'I am [the body or the like]', [which wrongly identifies the conscious self with the unconscious body etc.]. In other words, the false idea regarding the self means the [false] cognition of one who cognises as self what is not self, in the form, 'I am [the body or the like]'. What, again, is the group of entities which becomes the object of the false idea concerning the self ? [That is, what are the objects with the group of which the self is generally wrongly identified ?] [The group consists of] the body, the sense-organs, the mind, pleasure and pain, and cognition. [Cf. *Bhāṣya* on *Nyāya-sūtra* iii. 1. 1].

How does the false idea concerning the self which has for its object [the group of above-mentioned entities] become the root-cause of [one's confinement to] worldly existence ? One who has—in the form 'I am [the body etc.]' —wrongly ascertained [the self as nothing but] an aggregate of the body etc. thinks that the annihilation of the body etc. would result in the annihilation of the very self. Thinking thus, he becomes overwhelmed by the passion for not being annihilated and takes up the body etc. again and again [through different births]. Taking up the body etc. in this way, he [foolishly] strives for birth and death and, therefore, not being free from [the bondage of] the body etc., fails to attain freedom from suffering.

On the other hand, one who looks upon suffering, the locus through which suffering is experienced [i. e. the body] and the different forms of pleasure which are all invriably connected with suffering [as nothing but suffering] in the form "all these are sufferings only" rightly understands [the nature of] suffering, and then, suffering—the nature of which has been rightly understood—is totally forsaken, for, just like poisoned food, one does never take it up. In the same way, one looks upon the evils and the actions also as nothing but causes of suffering, and since an absolute cessation of the stream of sufferings is not possible so long as the evils are not totally avoided, one forsakes the evils. And it has already been said [in *Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 1. 63] : when the evils have been totally forsaken, 'one's actions do not lead to re-birth'.

[That is why Gautama] specifies re-birth (*pretyabhāva*), result (*phala*) and suffering (*duḥkha*) as what must be rightly known and also, actions and evils as what is to be totally forsaken [by one striving for liberation]. Liberation is the final goal and the means for achieving it is right knowledge. And the knowledge [of the *prameya*-s] as they really are—i. e. the right knowledge [of the *prameya*-s]—is produced in respect of only one who properly practises or repeatedly performs [actions] or correctly meditates with regard to the *prameya*-s which are thus divided into four classes. [That is, one who assiduously medi-

tates upon the true nature of the *prameya*-s acquires the right knowledge of the *prameya*-s and becomes liberated].

Elucidation

In the concluding portion of the *Bhāṣya*, Vātsyāyana refers to a four-fold classification of the twelve *prameya*-s. According to some, of the four classes into which the *prameya*-s are said to be divided here, the first one consists of those *prameya*-s the aggregate of which becomes the object of the 'false idea concerning the self' (*ahaṃkāra*), namely, the body, the sense-organs, the mind, pleasure and pain, and cognition ; the second one of those *prameya*-s which must be rightly known by one striving for liberation, namely, re-birth, result and suffering ; the third one of those *prameya*-s which must be totally avoided by one striving for liberation, namely, actions and evils ; and the fourth one of that which is the final goal, namely, liberation. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa rejects this classification by raising a number of objections against it. First, the right knowledge of all the twelve *prameya*-s—from self to liberation —is actually admitted to be the cause of liberation. It cannot, therefore, be claimed that only rebirth, result and suffering are to be rightly known by one striving for liberation. Secondly, all the *prameya*-s which are of the nature of either suffering or cause of suffering are to be totally avoided by one striving for liberation. It is, therefore, improper to characterise only actions and evils as objects to be avoided. Thirdly, the above classification leaves out the first and the fourth *prameya*-s —the self and the objects of the senses respectively—enumerated by Gautama.

According to Phaṇibhūṣaṇa himself the classification should be as follows. The first class comprises of *prameya*-s that are *heya* or objects to be avoided, namely, the ten *prameya*-s—from body to suffering—as enlisted in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 9, because these are all of the nature of either suffering or cause of suffering. The second class comprises of liberation only which is the ultimate goal to be attained by a human being and is, therefore, not to be avoided. The third class comprises of right knowledge only which, though of the nature of *buddhi* included in the class of *heya* is not to be actually avoided, because it is the very means (*upāya*) for attaining liberation. Thus, *buddhi* as included in the class of *heya* is to be taken as referring to false knowledge only. The fourth class comprises of the self only which is the agent that actually attains the final goal or libertion through the means of right knowledge. It must, therefore, be distinct from what is to be avoided, what is to be finally attained and the means thereof.

Bhāṣya

Thus—

Sūtra 1

The cessation of the false idea concerning the self results from [acquiring] the right knowledge about the causes of evil. //iv. 2. 1//

Bhāṣya

The *prameya*-s—starting from the body and ending with suffering [as in the list given by *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 9]—are the [indirect] causes of evil, for the false knowledge [which is actually the direct cause of evil] has these[*prameya*-s] as its object. Therefore, when produced, the right knowledge which has for its object the said *prameya*-s [viz. the body etc.] removes the false idea concerning the self which too has for its object the same *prameya*-s [viz. the body etc.], because the two [viz. right knowledge and false knowledge] are opposed to each other with regard to the same object only. [That is, the false knowledge of *x* is removed by the right knowledge of *x* only and not of anything else. Thus, the false idea concerning the self which is nothing but false knowledge about the body etc. is removed, when there is produced right knowledge about the real nature of the body etc.] Thus, [it has been maintained that] liberation is attained through right knowledge, when each previous one in the series of 'suffering, birth, activity, evil and false knowledge' is removed as a consequence of the removal of the one immediately preceding it [*Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 2].

And by this [i. e. by what has been said in the present *sūtra*] is only reiterated the doctrine of the system [already stated] in brief [under *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 2] and no new doctrine is being put forward.

Elucidation

According to Vātsyāyana, the expression 'causes of evil' in the *sūtra* stands for the ten *prameya*-s enumerated by Gautama in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 9, excluding

the first and the last ones, i. e. self and liberation respectively, for a living being is afflicted by the three evils of attachment, aversion and ignorance so long as he is in possession of the body, the sense-organs and the like, and one evil may indeed be the cause of another evil. The remaining two *prameya*-s, the self and the state of liberation, on the other hand, cannot be considered to be so, because a liberated person, though in possession of both, is not observed to be oppressed by any of the three evils. Of these, however, false knowledge actually is the direct cause of the evils and this has been indicated by Gautama himself by placing 'evil' immediately before 'false knowledge' in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 2. How then the body etc. are to be looked upon as causes of evil ? Vātsyāyana answers that the reason for this is that the body and the other nine *prameya*-s generally constitute the very object (*viṣaya*) of the false knowledge which is the direct cause of the evils.

The underlying implication of Vātsyāyana's concluding remark that the present *sūtra* does not state any new standpoint, but only re-asserts something already stated is that, in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 2, Gautama has only mentioned that the removal of false knowledge ultimately leads to the cessation of all sufferings or liberation. However, there he does neither specify the exact form of the false knowledge nor refer to the particular form of right knowledge that will remove it and lead to liberation. Through the re-assertion made by the present *sūtra*, Gautama now clearly states (i) that false knowledge in *Nyāya-sūtra* i. 1. 2 means not only the false knowledge about the self, but also the false knowledge about the other eleven *prameya*-s like the body etc., for both forms of false knowledge constitute the cause of one's confinement to worldly existence, and (ii) that such false knowledge is removed only by the right knowledge about the same group of *prameya*-s, for right knowledge and false knowledge are contradictory to each other only with regard to the same object.

It is to be noted that here the false knowledge of the self means the false knowledge about one's own individual self only and not about the selves in general, for one suffers from the three evils of attachment, aversion and ignorance, and is compelled to travel through the cycle of re-births, when one wrongly considers one's own self to be identical with one's own body, sense-organs and the like only. Gautama's implication, therefore, is that when such false knowledge is removed by the right knowledge about one's own individual self, one becomes free from the evils and is liberated ultimately. Accordingly, the earlier commentators like Vātsyāyana and others—as opposed to Viśvanātha and some others—take self or *ātman* in Gautama's list of the *prameya*-s, to mean the individual self or *jīvātman* only and not also God, the supreme self or *paramātman*, as well.

But, then, it may be asked, why God—the supreme self or *paramātman*—has not at all been mentioned in the list of either the sixteen categories or the twelve

prameya-s in the *Nyāya-sūtra* ? The answer to this, as Phaṇibhūṣaṇa explains, is that, in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, Gautama uses the term *prameya* in a technical sense to mean those specific objects of knowledge only the false knowledge about which binds one to this world of suffering and the right knowledge about which, by dispelling the said false knowledge, leads to liberation. God or *paramātman* who is the creator and efficient cause of the world is essentially different from *jīvātman* or the individual self, and the false knowledge about God is not the root-cause of one's confinement to worldly existence. In other words, though God may be looked upon as a *prameya* in a general sense—in the sense that God is an entity provable by some *pramāṇa*, still God can be characterised as neither *heya* (what is to be shunned) nor *adhigantavya* (what is to be ultimately attained) nor *upāya* (means for attaining the ultimate goal) nor *adhigantṛ* (one who attains the ultimate goal). Accordingly, God's absence in the lists of the categories and the *prameya*-s is justified.

The above may, however, prompt one to put in a further question : does not then Gautama admit any efficiency of the right knowledge of God for the attainment of liberation ? Is only the right knowledge of the specific twelve *prameya*-s and nothing else quite sufficient in this regard ? Phaṇibhūṣaṇa's answer to this is that the indispensability of the right knowledge of God in the attainment of liberation is a doctrine established by *śruti* and Gautama, being an upholder of the validity and infallibility of the *śruti*, cannot but accept the same as his own. In fact, Vātsyāyana, while referring to the *śruti* passages that speak of liberation, has already quoted one from the *Śvetāśvataropaniṣat* (iii. 8) which clearly indicates that the right knowledge of God is indispensable for the attainment of liberation [cf. under *Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 1. 59 ; *Nyāya Philosophy*, part iv. p. 82]. Udayana's remark too (*Nyāya-kusumāñjali* i. 2) lends support to the same view, and his two commentators Varadarāja and Vardhamāna, though in their own way, discuss critically how the right knowledge of God becomes indispensable for the attainment of liberation. In his *Muktivāda*, however, Gadādhara argues against such a position and maintains that when a person striving for liberation realises the true nature of his own self he attains liberation because of the complete annihilation of all the *saṃskāra*-s, *dharma* and *adharma* which are the products of false knowledge and, therefore, there is no ground for admitting the realisation of God as a further cause.

Bhāṣya

However, the order [in which] the right knowledge (*prasaṃkhyāna*, lit. excellent and thorough knowledge) [of the various *prameya*-s is to be acquired is indicated by the following *sūtra*, viz.]—

Sūtra 2

The objects like colour and others, when subjected to [wrong] deliberation (*saṃkalpa*), become the causes of the evils. //iv. 2. 2//

Bhāṣya

The objects of the senses [viz. smell, taste, colour, touch and sound] are the objects of desire, and hence, they are referred to as 'colour and others'. When these [i. e. colour and others] are wrongly deliberated upon [as desirable], they produce attachment, aversion and ignorance. And these should be rightly ascertained first. When one rightly ascertains them, one's wrong deliberations concerning the objects like colour and others are all removed. Again, after such wrong deliberations have all been removed, one should rightly ascertain the body etc. with reference to the self [i. e. one should rightly differentiate the body etc. from the self] and from such right ascertainment [of the nature of the body etc.], there follows the cessation of all wrong notions concerning the [nature of the] self. Thus, one [who is free from all wrong notions concerning the nature of the self and] lives on with one's mind free from any attachment to the self or anything external is said to be liberated.

Elucidation

It has been stated in the previous *sūtra* that a person striving for liberation should acquire the right knowledge of the causes of the evils, namely, the ten *prameya*-s from 'body' to 'suffering'. In the present *sūtra*, Gautama states the order in which the respective *prameya*-s are to be rightly known. Thus, one should rightly ascertain the objects like colour and others first, and then, the body etc. and the self.

According to Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, the concluding remark of Vātsyāyana that one is said to be liberated, when one—after realising the true nature of the self—lives on with one's mind attached to neither the self nor anything external, refers to the fact of *jīvan-mukti* or 'emancipation while still alive'.

Bhāṣya

After this is being laid down what notion (*saṃjñā*) is to be discarded and what notion is to be meditated upon [by one striving for liberation]. And this [i. e. the following *sūtra*] has nothing to do with either the refutation of [the reality of] an [external] object or the acceptance of [the reality of] an [external] object. How is it so ?

Sūtra 3

The cause of all those evils, however, is the 'erroneous idea' (*abhimāna*) regarding the 'whole' (*avayavin*). //iv. 2. 3//

Bhāṣya

The cause of all those evils, however, is the erroneous idea regarding the 'whole'. [For example], such [an erroneous] idea, in the case of a man, would be the notion 'this woman is beautiful (*sapariṣkārā* , literally, adorned with purity)' or, in the case of a woman, would be the notion 'this man is handsome'.

And there are also 'notions based on a mark' (*nimitta-saṃjñā*) and 'notions based on super-imposition through resemblance' (*anuvyañjana-saṃjñā*).

The notions based on a mark are 'this is the tongue', 'these are the ears', 'these are the teeth', 'these are the lips', 'these are the eyes' and 'this is the nose'. [That is, when a man longing for a woman's company identifies as such her different limbs or when a woman longing for a man's company identifies as such his different limbs, the notions of the two illustrate notions based on a mark.]

The example of a notion based on super-imposition through resemblance would be : such and such are the lips [of this man or of this woman]. [That is, when a man or a woman super-imposes, on account of resemblance, something else on her or his limbs, their notions would illustrate the present type of notions. Thus, for instance, a man deeply attached to a woman may super-impose the moon on her face on account of their extraordinary charm and say 'her face is verily the moon'.]

All such notions intensify sexual desire as well as the evils that invariably accompany it and are really to be shunned. [Therefore, one striving for liberation] must discard these notions [very carefully].

[There is also another kind of notion], namely, 'notion based on a limb of the body' (*avayava-saṃjñā*) which is to be distinguished from 'notion based on a mark' (*nimitta-saṃjñā*). For example, the notion [of a man or a woman looking upon her or his body—not as something beautiful and desirable—but only as an assemblage of] different kinds of hair, flesh, blood, bones, sinews, tendons, the elements of the phlegmy and the bilious, excrements and the like. This [i. e. an *avayava-saṃjñā*] is called by the learned a 'notion of the vicious' (*aśubha-saṃjñā*). As one meditates upon such a notion, one's attachment due to sexual desire is totally destroyed.

It is true that both kinds of objects [underlying the two kinds of notions, viz. *avayava-saṃjñā* and the rest] are actually there. Still, here is being laid down what kind of notion is to be meditated upon, and what kind of notion is to be discarded. As for instance, in the case of food contaminated by poison, the notion 'it is food' makes one accept it, while the notion 'it is poison' makes one leave it aside. [That is, one striving for liberation should meditate upon *avayava-saṃjñā* only and discard all other *saṃjñā*-s. One would thus become free from the evils and attain liberation ultimately.]

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE PRODUCTION OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE

(*tattvajñānotpatti-prakaraṇa*)

II. On the reality of the part and the whole

Bhāṣya

Now, the denial [of the reality] of the 'whole' is sought to be established with arguments by one who intends to deny [the reality of] the [external] objects. [That is, Gautama is now going to present, in his own way, the position of the opponent who seeks to deny the reality of the 'whole'.]

Sūtra 4

There is doubt [regarding the reality or unreality of the 'whole'], because apprehension (*vidyā*) and non-apprehension (*avidyā*) are of two kinds. //iv. 2. 4//

Bhāṣya

Apprehension is of two kinds, because there is apprehension sometimes of the existent [e.g. the apprehension of water in a pool] and sometimes of the non-existent [e.g. the apprehension of water in a mirage]. Non-apprehension too is of two kinds, because there is non-apprehension sometimes of the existent [e.g. the non-apprehension of water hidden under the earth] and sometimes of the non-existent [e.g. the non-apprehension of a horn on the hare's head].

If the 'whole' is [claimed to be] apprehended [as real], there would be doubt [regarding its reality], because of the twofoldness of apprehension. If, again, the 'whole' is [claimed to be] not apprehended [as real], there would be doubt [regarding its reality], because of the twofoldness of non-apprehension. Thus, even if the 'whole' is apprehended [as real] or even if the 'whole' is not apprehended [as real], one can in no way be free from such a doubt.

Elucidation

In the preceding *sūtra* (iv. 2. 3), Gautama has stated that the cause of evils is the erroneous idea regarding the 'whole'. However, there being controversy, from very ancient times, concerning the reality of the 'whole', Gautama, in the present section,

critically establishes the reality of the 'whole', for, if the 'whole' itself does not exist really, there can be no question of an erroneous idea about it. Every critical examination, again, presupposes a doubt and, therefore, Gautama opens the present section by way of explaining how a doubt regarding the reality or unreality of the 'whole' may be produced.

Vācaspati Miśra says here that Gautama, after explaining in the previous section, his own view of right knowledge or *tattvajñāna*, now discusses, with a view to refuting the right knowledge or *tattvajñāna* as advocated by the Vijñānavādins—who admit the reality of knowledge alone and neither of the 'whole' nor of the atoms—how the 'whole' is sought to be denied by the opponent. According to the Vijñānavādins, knowledge alone has real existence and all the other so-called external objects in the world are nothing but non-entities and hence, it may be objected against Gautama that there is no possibility at all of any *avayava-saṃjñā* or *anuvyañjana-saṃjñā* (which, under the preceding *sūtra*, is said to be the cause of evils), for such notions presuppose the reality of external objects. Accordingly, Gautama once again starts, in the present section, the defence of the reality of the 'whole'.

Vātsyāyana takes the words *vidyā* and *avidyā* of the *sūtra* in the senses of *upalabdhi* (apprehension) and *anupalabdhi* (non-apprehension) respectively and, explaining the implication of Gautama, says that apprehension is of two kinds, for one may apprehend sometimes an object which is actually present there and also sometimes an object which is not actually present there. In the same way, we can speak of two kinds of non-apprehension also, according as the object not apprehended is actually present or absent there. Thus, due to such duality of apprehension and non-apprehension, neither the apprehension nor the non-apprehension of the 'whole' becomes capable of removing the doubt as to its reality or unreality for, even after one apprehends the 'whole' there may be produced a doubt in the form 'Does this apprehension pertain to an actually existing 'whole' or to an actually non-existing 'whole' ?' Again, even if one does not apprehend the 'whole', there may be produced a doubt in the form 'Does this non-apprehension pertain to an actually existing 'whole' or to an actually non-existing 'whole' ?' And either of the doubts ultimately leads to a doubt concerning the reality or unreality of the 'whole' itself.

Viśvanātha, however, explains the *sūtra* in a different way. According to him, the words *vidyā* and *avidyā* here mean 'valid knowledge' (*pramā*) and 'illusory knowledge' (*bhramajñāna*) respectively, and the doubt regarding the 'whole' is due to such duality of knowledge, for, even after cognising the 'whole', one may be confronted with a doubt concerning the nature of the cognition itself—viz. Is this cognition of the 'whole' a valid one or an illusory one ?—and such a doubt ultimately leads to a doubt concerning the object of the cognition, viz. the 'whole'.

Sūtra 5

[Gautama's contention] There is no doubt concerning [the reality or unreality of] the 'whole', because [the existence of the 'whole'] is well-established by the grounds previously mentioned. //iv. 2. 5//

Bhāṣya

The doubt concerning [the reality or unreality of] the 'whole' is not justified. Why ? Because the grounds previously mentioned [in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1. 34-36 for proving the existence of the 'whole'] stand unrefuted and the emergence of a distinct substance [in the form of the 'whole'] is necessarily to be admitted.

Sūtra 6

[Opponent's contention] But, then, [it may as well be argued that] there is no doubt concerning [the reality or unreality of] the 'whole', because [the non-existence of the 'whole' is well-established by the fact that] the presence [neither of the 'whole' within the parts nor of the parts within the 'whole'] is also logically justified. //iv. 2. 6//

Bhāṣya

[Opponent's contention] But, then, [it may as well be argued that] the doubt [concerning the reality or unreality of the 'whole'] is not justified on the ground that the presence [neither of the 'whole' within the parts nor of the parts within the 'whole'] is also logically justified, [and this fact proves that] the 'whole' does not exist.

Elucidation

Gautama denies the doubt concerning the 'whole' on the ground that the existence of the 'whole' is proved conclusively, while the opponent denies the same on the ground that the non-existence of the 'whole' is proved conclusively.

Bhāṣya

It [i. e. the argument, mentioned by the opponent in *sūtra* 6, for proving the non-existence of the 'whole'] is being explained [as follows]—

Sūtra 7

[Opponent's view] The 'whole' does not exist, because the parts can occupy neither the entire (*kṛtsna*) ['whole'] nor any segment (*ekadeśa*) [of the 'whole']. //iv. 2. 7//

Bhāṣya

[Opponent's view] Each individual part, however, cannot occupy singly the entire 'whole', because there is difference in the magnitudes of the two [viz. an individual part and the entire 'whole'], and also because there arises the absurdity of there being no relation [of the 'whole' which is entirely occupied by a particular individual part] with the other individual parts. Nor can each individual part occupy any segment of the 'whole', for the 'whole' has, as its segment, no section other than those individual component parts themselves.

Elucidation

Clarifying further his objection to the admission of the reality of the 'whole', as mentioned under *sūtra* 6, the opponent now explains why it cannot be claimed that the parts are present within the 'whole'. The opponent's contention is that of the two possible alternatives in this regard—(i) that each of the individual parts occupies the entire 'whole' and (ii) that each of the individual parts occupies a particular segment of the 'whole'—neither can be defended logically.

The first alternative is not acceptable because of two considerations. First, one individual part cannot occupy the entire 'whole', since they have different magnitudes. Take, for instance, a tree and its branches which (according to the Naiyāyika) represent a 'whole' and its parts respectively. A tree as a 'whole' is much larger than any of its branches and obviously no single branch can extend itself over the whole of a tree. Secondly, if one individual part is accepted as

occupying the entire 'whole', the other individual parts cannot be related with the 'whole', for the entire space enclosed within the 'whole' being taken up by one individual part, there would remain no further room that may be occupied by any of the other individual parts.

The second alternative too is untenable. A particular *segment* of the 'whole' really represents nothing but some particular individual *part* of the 'whole', because the 'whole' has no other section—that may be called a segment—except the individual constituent parts. In other words, to admit that each individual part occupies a particular segment of the 'whole' amounts to conceding that each individual part occupies only its own self, which is, however, absurd.

Thus, the parts can in no way be present within what is alleged to be the 'whole' and hence, it is established that the 'whole' does not really exist.

Bhāṣya

Now, if it be claimed that the 'whole' actually is present within the parts ? [To this, the opponent answers]—

Sūtra 8

[Opponent's view] The 'whole' does not exist, because the 'whole' also cannot be present within the parts. //iv. 2. 8//

Bhāṣya

[Opponent's view] [The entire 'whole'], however, cannot occupy each one of the individual parts, because there is difference in the magnitudes of the two [viz. the entire 'whole' and an individual part] and also beeause there arises the absurdity of a substance inhering only in one single substance [viz. an individual part]. Nor [can it be said that the 'whole'] occupies all the individual parts through its various segments, because there is no other part [of the 'whole' except those individual component parts themselves].

Therefore, the doubt [concerning the reality or unreality of the 'whole'] is not justified, beeause [it is established that the] 'whole' does not exist.

Elucidation

Those who uphold the reality of the 'whole' may argue : we do not say that the parts are contained within the 'whole', for we claim, on the contrary, that the 'whole' actually is contained within the parts—that the parts and the 'whole' represent respectively the substratum (*ādhāra*) and the superstratum (*ādheya*), and there subsists a substratum-superstratum relation between the two. Thus, the existence of the 'whole' within the parts being justifiable, it is not to be claimed that the 'whole' is a non-entity. In the present *sūtra*, Gautama states how the opponent replies to such a rejoinder.

As Vātsyāyana explains, to justify the existence of 'whole' within the parts one would have to establish either of these alternatives : (i) the entire 'whole' occupies each one of the individual parts and (ii) the 'whole' occupies all the parts through its segments. But neither of the alternatives can be defended logically. The entire 'whole' which has a greater magnitude cannot occupy any one of the individual parts which has a smaller magnitude, because a substance of smaller magnitude can never contain within itself another substance of a greater magnitude. Moreover, the claim that the entire 'whole' occupies each one of the individual parts leads to an absurdity : that the entire 'whole' inheres in—i.e. is produced from or composed by—one single substance only, for each of the individual parts represents a single and distinct substance.

What is the harm in admitting that the 'whole' is produced from one single substance or part only ? Uddyotakara points out that, in that case, one would have to accept as the cause of the 'whole' the same individual part as is said to be occupied by the entire 'whole' and thus, there would follow the absurdity of the 'whole' being produced always. Explaining further the point of Uddyotakara, Vācaspati Miśra says that one who admits that a substance in the form of the 'whole' is produced from a conjunction of more than one substance in the form of the parts may very well claim that the group of those various substances in the form of the parts is the substratum and inherent cause of the 'whole' and the cause for a conjunction of the parts being not present always, the 'whole' too cannot be produced always.

If, however, each of the individual parts—taken separately or singly—is considered to be the substratum and inherent cause of the entire 'whole', the conjunction of the different parts would no longer be a pre-condition for the production of the 'whole' and the 'whole' may come into being always, for so long as an individual part representing the inherent cause of the 'whole' (as also the only necessary condition) is there, the 'whole' too must be there. As a further objection from the standpoint of one who denies the reality of the 'whole', Uddyotakara lastly notes that if one admits the first alternative, one would not be able to explain logically the destruction of a dyad (*dvyaṇuka*) which is admitted to be a substance produced from two atoms, the inherent causes and their conjunction. A dyad cannot be said to be destroyed due to the destruction of the inherent cause, for its inherent causes are eternal. Nor can its destruction be said

to be due to the disjunction of the component parts or the atoms. If it is admitted that the entire 'whole' in the form of the dyad occupies each one of its constituent atoms separately—i.e. if it is concluded that each one of the two disjoined atoms is the substratum of the entire dyad, it is also to be accepted that each one of the two atoms singly constitutes the inherent cause of the dyad. Thus, the conjunction of the two atoms not being a pre-condition for the production of the dyad, it cannot be maintained that the disjunction of the two conjoined atoms leads to the destruction of the dyad.

Pointing to the untenability of the second alternative—i.e. the 'whole' occupies all the parts through its various segments—Vātsyāyana says that the segments of the 'whole' are really nothing but the component parts themselves. The second alternative would have been justified only if it could have been shown that the segments of the 'whole' represent some constituent elements of the 'whole' other than the component parts themselves. This is, however, not possible and the second alternative, therefore, does not stand logically.

Sūtra 9

[Opponent's view] [The 'whole' does not exist], also because the 'whole' is present neither within something other than the parts. // iv. 2.9 //

Bhāṣya

[Opponent's view] The expression "the 'whole' does not exist" follows [i.e. is to be added here from the previous *sūtra* for completing the sense]. The 'whole' is present neither within something other than the parts, for it is not perceived [elsewhere] and also, there would follow the absurdity of [the 'whole'] being eternal.

Elucidation

It cannot also be argued that the 'whole' exists apart from its component parts, because the 'whole' is never perceived within something other than the component parts. To avoid all these difficulties, one upholding the reality of the 'whole' may, as a last resort, claim : we admit the 'whole' to be 'without any substratum' (*anādhāra*). To this, Vātsyāyana objects that, in that case, the 'whole' would become an eternal entity, for whatever substance is without a substratum is eternal, as for instance, *ākāśa* and the like.

Viśvanātha considers *sūtra*-s 7-8 above as statements of Vātsyāyana, though commenting that, according to some, these are *sūtra*-s of Gautama. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa,

however, points out that there can be no doubt that according to Vātsyāyana himself these were genuine *sūtra*-s of Gautama, for this is evident from Vātsyāyana's remark *tad vibhajyate* introducing *sūtra* 7 and the comment under *sūtra* 9 that the expression *avayavyabhāvaḥ* follows from the previous *sūtra.*

Sūtra 10

[Opponent's view] Nor is the 'whole' [identical] with the parts. [That is, it also cannot be maintained that the 'whole' is both different from and identical with the parts.] // iv. 2.10 //

Bhāṣya

[Opponent's view] The 'whole' cannot also be [admitted to be] a property (*dharma*) of the parts. Why ? Because, in the same way as shown previously, the relation of the 'mere property' (*dharmamātra=avayavin* or the 'whole') with the property-possessors (*dharmin*)—i.e. the parts—cannot be logically justified, and the argument—since the property [i.e. the 'whole'] is never perceived apart from the property-possessors, the parts—equally applies here also [i.e. goes against the present contention also].

Elucidation

According to some, the 'whole' is only a property of the parts themselves and it is an entity neither absolutely different from nor absolutely indentical with parts, for two entities either absolutely different from or absolutely identical with each other cannot be related as the property and the property-possessor. Thus, as against the opponent, one may argue that the 'whole' resides in the parts through 'some sort of a relation of identity' (*kathañcid-abheda-sambandha*) and the reality of the 'whole' cannot be challenged.

Explaining the answer to the above as given by the opponent, Vātsyāyana says that one admitting the 'whole' to be a property of the parts would have to explain logically the residence of the property or the 'whole' within the property-possessors or the parts. But it has been already shown (under *sūtra* 8) that the 'whole' cannot be contained within the parts. Thus, a relation between the 'whole' and the parts being inconceivable, the two cannot be characterised as the property and the property-possessor. Nor can it be said that the 'whole', though a property of the parts, exists apart from the parts, for, in the same way as under *sūtra* 9, it can be refuted by pointing out that the 'whole' is never perceived apart from its parts.

Vācaspati Miśra refers to some further objections against the above view from the opponent's standpoint. First, it cannot be said that the 'whole' is not only different from but also identical with the parts, because identity and difference which imply respectively absence of difference and absence of identity are mutually opposed and cannot co-exist in the same substratum. Secondly, if the 'whole' and the parts are admitted to be absoluetly identical, the 'whole' cannot be considered a property of the parts, for the 'relation of being the property and the property-possessor' (*dharma-dharmi-bhāva*) cannot subsist between two entities absolutely identical with each other.

Viśvanātha explains the *sūtra* in a plain and simple way. According to him, the opponent's contention here is : it can neither be said that there is identity between the 'whole' and the parts, for no one considers a thread to be a piece of cloth or a pillar a house. Besides, the substratum-superstratum relation between the parts and the 'whole' also cannot be justified, if the two are considered identical. If the threads be nothing different from a piece of cloth, how can it be maintained that a piece of cloth is contained within the threads ?

Sūtra 11

[Answer] The question [regarding the occupation of the parts by the 'whole' as has been raised above by the opponent], does not arise, because, there being no difference within a single entity, the use of 'words signifying difference' (*bheda-śabda*) is not justified. // iv. 2.11 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The question—Is the entire 'whole' present within each of the individual parts ? Or, is it present there through a particular segment ?—is not logically possible. Why ? Because, there being no difference within a single entity, the use of words signifying difference is not justified. The word 'entire' (*kṛtsna*) signifies the total number of entities when there are many, and the word 'segment' (*ekadeśa*) signifies any one of the entities when there are different ones. Thus, [the use of] neither of these two words, namely, 'entire' and 'segment'—both of which refer to difference [i.e. are to be used in respect of entities only when there are different ones]—can be justified in respect of a single entity due to [the fact that] there is no difference [within a single entity].

Elucidation

As against the Nyāya conclusion that the 'whole' actually resides, through the relation of inherence, within the parts which are its inherent causes, it has been asked

by the opponent: how does the 'whole' occupy each of the individual parts—in its entirety, or through some particular segment only ? In answer, Gautama says in the present *sūtra* that the very question of the opponent is unjustified, because each 'whole' like the tree etc. is a single and separate entity. The question of the opponent is not at all possible in respect of any such single 'whole', because there is no difference within its own self. Difference can be spoken of only if there are more than one entity, and not in the case of a single one. Thus, the use of words like *kṛtsna* and *ekadeśa* which signify difference is not justified in the case of a single 'whole' and as such, the opponent's contention too remains unjustified. It may, however, be pointed out that a single 'whole' too is constituted by many individual parts, and the words *kṛtsna* and *ekadeśa* may even be employed in respect of a single 'whole' to mean respectively the aggregate of all the individual parts and any one of the various individual parts. Still, the implication of Gautama's answer here is that the opponent can never put forward the said question by considering the 'whole' a single entity.

To sum up, each 'whole'—as a single and separate entity—resides in its parts or the inherent causes through the relation of inherence. There is no question of 'entirety' or 'segment' in this regard. Thus, it is to be concluded that just like the universals of substance-hood (*dravyatva*) and jarness (*ghaṭatva*) which, reside, without being delimited (*niravacchinna-rūpe*), in a substance or a jar, through the relation of inherence, the 'whole' too resides, without being delimited, within the parts, through the relation of inherence. Therefore, the reality of the 'whole' cannot be denied on the ground that the 'whole' can in no way be present within the parts.

Bhāṣya

[The argument—viz. the 'whole'] cannot be present through its various segments, because there is no other part—is not a proper ground [for establishing the unreality of the 'whole']. [And this is explained by Gautama as follows] :

Sūtra 12

[Answer continued] [The argument that the 'whole' cannot occupy the different individual parts through its various segments, because there is no other part of the 'whole' except the individual component parts themselves] is not a proper ground [for establishing the unreality of the 'whole'], because, even if there existed some other parts, the 'whole' would not have been [proved to be] present within the parts. // iv. 2.12 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer continued] [As to the argument] 'because there is no other part', [Gautama replies as follows]. Even if there existed a segment in the form of some other part, one part would have been present within another part, but not the 'whole' [within the parts]. Thus, since the 'whole' is not [proved to be] present within the parts in spite of the existence of some other part, the argument that the 'whole' cannot occupy the different individual parts through its various segments, because there is no other part of the 'whole' cannot be a proper ground [for denying the reality of the 'whole'].

What, then, is the nature of the presence (*vṛtti*) [of the 'whole' within the parts] ? [Presence of the 'whole' within the parts means] occurrence (*prāpti*), that is, the 'relation of being the substratum and the superstratum' (*āśraya-āśrita-sambandha*) between one substance [viz. the 'whole'] and many substances [viz. the parts].

When, again, is there the substratum-superstratum relation ? The substratum (*āśraya*) [of a product] is the entity elsewhere from which that [product] cannot be logically said to come into being. [In other words, a product or an effect is the superstratum (*āśrita*) and that particular substance within which alone the product or the effect comes into being is the substratum (*āśraya*).] A product (*kārya-dravya*) never comes into being anywhere except within the 'substances which are its [material] causes' (*kāraṇa-dravya*). [That is, the 'whole' which is a product always comes into being within the parts which are its material causes. Thus, the 'whole' represents the superstratum and the parts the substratum, and the substratum-superstratum relation between them is justified]. The reverse is the case with the substances that constitute the [material] causes. [That is, the parts which are the material causes of the 'whole' do not come into being within the 'whole'; they come into being elsewhere, namely, within their own component parts. Hence, the 'whole' cannot represent the substratum, nor the parts the superstratum].

[Objection] How would it [be possible] in the case of eternal entities ? [Answer] It would be established [in such cases] on the basis of its observation in the case of non-eternal entities. [Objection explained] How would the substratum-superstratum relation be possible in the case of the eternal substances [which are not products and have no material cause] ? [Answer] On the basis of the observation of the substratum-superstratum relation in the case of the non-eternal substances and their qualities, such a relation is established also in the case of the eternal substances [i.e. though the eternal substances being partless cannot be said to be related through the substram-superstratum relation in the 'part-whole' manner, still, such a relation is possible between the eternal substances and their respective qualities].

Therefore, in respect of one striving for liberation, only the erroneous idea regarding the 'whole' is being prohibited, but [the reality of] the 'whole' has not been

denied ; just as, only the wrong deliberations in respect of colour etc. have been prohibited, but [the reality of] colour etc. themselves has not been denied.

Elucidation

In the present *sūtra*, Gautama refutes the opponent's contention—already noted by Vātsyāyana under *sūtra* 8—that the 'whole' cannot be said to be present within the component parts even through its segments (*ekadeśa*), because there is no other part of the 'whole' except the 'component parts' (*avayava*) themselves. Thus, from the statement of the opponent it appears that, according to him, the 'whole' could have been present within its own component parts through segments, if there would have existed some other part of the 'whole' besides the component parts themselves. As against this, Gautama points out that even if some different part of the 'whole' were admitted, the 'whole' could not have been present through it within the component parts, inasmuch as, in that case, that different part only—and not the 'whole' itself—would have occupied the component parts. In other words, according to the opponent's line of argument, whether some different part of the 'whole' really exists or not, the 'whole' can in no way be present within the component parts. Thus, the ground mentioned by the opponent—viz. the absence of some other part of the 'whole'—does not constitute a proper ground.

So far Gautama has only discussed and refuted the position of the opponent. He has not stated, however, whether in his own view the 'whole' is present within the parts or the parts within the 'whole' and what exactly is the nature of such presence (*vṛtti*). Following Kaṇāda who in the Vaiśeṣikadarśana states all these clearly, Vātsyāyana therefore adds that, according to Gautama also, the 'whole' is contained within the parts, that the 'whole' is the superstratum (*āśrita*) and the parts the substratum (*āśraya*) and thus, the presence of the 'whole' within the parts means only the 'substratum-superstratum relation' (*āśrayāśrita-sambandha*) between the two. As Uddyotakara points out, such a relation, again, is nothing but the 'relation of inherence' (*samavāya-sambandha*). How ? To say that the 'whole' is contained within the parts is to presuppose that there must be some kind of relation between the two. This relation cannot be explained by the relation of counjunction, because the relation of conjunction can subsist only between two substances 'which remain intact even when separated from each other' (*yutasiddha*). The 'whole' and the parts, however, can never exist as separated or disjoined from each other, for the separation of the parts from the 'whole' simply implies the disappearance of the 'whole' itself. The relation between the 'whole' and the parts, therefore, is to be accepted as the relation of inherence (cf. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*, vii.2.13 & 26, and Praśastapāda's definition of *samavāya* : *ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhāra-bhūtānām* etc.). Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out in this connection that undoubtedly, just like Kaṇāda, Gautama too admits the relation of inherence. For, Gautama too subscribes to the doctrine of *ārambha-vāda*

and, upholding the theory of *asatkāryavāda*, accepts the view that there is an absolute difference between the effect and its material cause. Besides, in *Nyāya-sūtra* iii.1.38, Gautama himself uses the word *samavāya* in the sense of the relation of inherence.

However, the followers of Sāṃkhya who subscribe to the theory of *satkārya-vāda* and others have not admitted *samavāya* or the relation of inherence. The author of the *Sāṃkhya-sūtra* (under *sūtra*-s v. 99f) rejects *samavāya* on the ground that there is neither perception nor inference to prove it. Under *Brahma-sūtra* (ii.2.12-13), Śaṃkarācārya and Rāmānuja also argue against the admission of *samavāya.* Later, of course, many logicians of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school have critically and elaborately discussed the nature of *samavāya*, and replied to the charges levelled by Śaṃkara and others. But, once again, the various arguments for *samavāya* offered by Praśastapāda, Udayana, Śrīdhara, Vallabha and others were subjected to vehement and detailed criticism by Citsukha in his *Tattvapradīpikā*, his main contention being that *samavāya* can be neither properly defined nor established by any *pramāṇa.*

As against the polemics of Citsukha, the following may briefly be noted. A correct definition of *samavāya* is possible, for it may be defined as an 'eternal relation which is not identical with a relatum' (*sambandhi-bhinna-nitya-sambandha*). The expression 'which is not identical with a relatum' has been added so that the definition may not unduly apply to the relation through which non-existence (*abhāva*) is located in an eternal substance, *ākāśa*, for instance. Such a relation is really identical with *ākāśa* and hence, becomes eternal. Still, it would not be covered by the definition of *samavāya* because of being identical with a relatum, namely, *ākāśa.* The charge that the present definition unduly applies to an eternal conjunction between two ubiquitous (*vibhu*) substances does not hold, because such eternal conjunction cannot be established by any *pramāṇa* and the admission of an eternal conjunction entails the illogical admission of an eternal disjunction as well. Even if it be granted that the existence of an eternal conjunction is established by an inference—by the one shown by Citsukha himself, for instance—it cannot be considered a relation at all, for it does not give rise to a 'qualificative cognition' (*viśiṣṭa-buddhi*). The difficulty of the definition's undue application to the case of an eternal conjunction, even if such a relation be looked upon as a genuine relation, may be avoided also by expanding the said definition of *samavāya*, that is, by adding the further expression 'which is also different from a conjunction' (*saṃyoga-bhinna*).

What, then, are the proofs for the existence of *samavāya* ? In many cases, the Naiyāyikas have admitted that the relation of *samavāya* is perceptible and have also shown inferences to prove its reality. In his *Nyāyalīlāvatī*, Vallabhācārya, however, denies the perceptibility of *samavāya* from the Vaiśeṣika standpoint and, as a proof in favour of it, speaks of inference only. The implication of such an inferential argument is that a qualificative cognition involving a quality, an action or a universal must reveal also a relation between the qualificand (*viśeṣya*) and the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), for no such

cognition can take place without revealing such a relation. As for instance, the qualificative cognition produced after the conjunction of the visual sense with a white jar—viz. this jar is characterised by white colour—necessarily reveals some kind of a relation between that jar and the white colour also. This relation cannot be explained by conjunction, because the jar and its white colour can never remain intact as separated or disjoined from each other. Nor can the relation be explained by the relation of identity, because the identity of the jar and its white colour is disproved by the fact that the perception of the jar through the cutaneous sense does not result in the perception of the white colour as well. It is, therefore, necessary to postulate a new kind of relation —namely, *samavāya*—for explaining the above-mentioned cases of qualificative cognition.

As a futher objection against the admission of *samavāya*, it has been asked by the opponent : how is *samavāya* itself connected with its substratum ? If one admits some new relation—by which *samavāya* may be said to reside in its substratum—one would have to admit a still newer relation to connect the new relation to its own substratum, and the process would continue endlessly leading thereby to the fallacy of infinite regress. It would be of no avail to avoid the fallacy by conceding that *samavāya* is connected to its substratum by a *svarūpa* relation, for, in that case, the opponent contends, what is the use of postulating a new kind of relation in the form of *samavāya* ? The relation between a substance and its quality or the parts and the 'whole' or similar other entities (which, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, are said to be related by *samavāya*) may very well be explained by a *svarūpa* relation (as is actually done in the case of non-existence or *abhāva* and its locus).

In answar to the above, the followers of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintain that the relation between a substance and its quality, action etc., for instance, cannot be explained by a *svarūpa* relation, because, due to the innumerability of the substances as well as their qualities, actions ete., it cannot be specifically determined what particular entity such a *svarūpa* relation is to be ultimately identified with, and the admission of a *svarūpa* relation in such a case would amount to conceiving as relation an infinite number of entities, which is however not logical. Such a dificulty, on the other hand, does not arise in the case of *samavāya*, for the relation of *samavāya* is conceived as one and the same in all cases and a *svarūpa* relation connecting *samavāya* to its substratum would be ultimately identical with this uniform or unvarying *samavāya*. In short, the relation between *samavāya* and its substratum may very well be stated as a '*svarūpa* relation which is self-identical' (*svātmaka-svarūpa-sambandha* ; *sva*=*samavāya*). Besides, a *svarūpa* relation is accepted only as a last resort when no other relation is logically conceivable. In the case of substances and their qualities, actions etc., the the relation can be logically explained by the relation of *samavāya* and hence, the question of a *svarūpa* relation does not arise. In the case of non-existence and its locus, however, no other relation can be justified and hence, one has got to admit that non-existence is connected to its locus by a *svarūpa* relation, in spite of the fact that in

many cases such a relation is ultimately to be conceived as identical with an infinite number of entities, namely, the innumerable loci of the non-existence.

However, in his *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*, Raghunātha speaks of different kinds of *samavāya* and admits (in agrrement with the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas) a new relation called *vaiśiṣṭya* connecting non-existence and its locus. Of the philosophers belonging to schools other than the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Guru Prabhākara admits the relation of *samavāya* between a universal (*jāti*) and an individual (*vyakti*) which, according to him, are absoluetly different from each other. He, however, does not accept the eternality of *samavāya.*

It is to be noted that, regarding the reality or unreality of the 'whole', the Buddhists have critically upheld what Gautama has critically refuted here. Of them, the Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika schools, belonging to the Hīnayāna sect, admit the the reality of external objects which, they contend, are nothing but mere aggregates of atoms and there is nothing in the form of a 'whole' over and above such an aggregate. In the second chapter (under *Nyāya-sūtra* ii.1.33-36), Vātsyāyana has already refuted this contention and shown the grounds for accepting the 'whole' as a distinct entity, and in the following *sūtra*-s of the present section also Gautama takes up once again the same view for refutation. According to Vācaspati Miśra, the opponent in the present section is represented by the Vijñānavādins who also do not admit anything in the form of a 'whole' and moreover, deny the existence of atoms even and accept *vijñāna* or consciouness as the only reality. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, disagrees with Vācaspati on the ground that the following *sūtra*-s of Gautama and Vātsyāyana's discussions thereon do not confirm Vācaspati's stand.

In the second chapter, Uddyotakara has already criticised and refuted the various arguments of the Buddhists rejecting the reality of the 'whole'. Under the present *sūtra* also, he refers to a further argument of the Buddhists. If there be a distinct entity in the form of the 'whole', they argue, it must have some colour of its own as distinct from that of the parts. Otherwise, there cannot be any visual perception of the alleged 'whole', for no substance without colour is observed to be known visually. But the 'whole' is not observed to be charactersed by any colour of its own as distinct from that of the parts and hence, there is no 'whole' distinct from the parts. In answer, Uddyotakara says that since the 'whole' is undoubtedly visually perceived there is no denying the fact that the 'whole' too has some colour of its own ; but there is a cause-effect relation between the colour of the parts and the colour of the 'whole', the former being the 'non-inherent cause' (*asamavāyi-kāraṇa*) of the latter. (That is why the colour of the parts and the colour of the 'whole' are generally of the same type.)

Bhāṣya

Even though already refuted [in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii.1.34] by [the argument that] 'everything will remain unperceived, if the existence of the 'whole' is denied [and an

object is regarded to be a mere aggregate of atoms instead], the opponent further contends as follows—

Sūtra 13

[Objection] The [visual] perception of an aggregate of atoms would be just like the [visual] perception of a mass of hairs by a 'person suffering from morbid vision' (*taimirika*). // iv. 2.13 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Just as, a person suffering form morbid vision does not perceive each single hair, yet he does perceive a mess of hairs ; so also, [even if] each single atom [constituting an aggregate] is not perceived, yet an aggregate of atoms is perceived [by a person with unimpaired vision]. And thus, what it [i.e. the perception of an object] reveals is nothing but a mere aggregate of atoms.

Elucidation

Already in *Nyāya-sūtra* ii.1.34, Gautama has argued that if a distinct entity in the form of a 'whole' is not admitted and every object is equated to a mere aggregate of atoms, no object would ever be perceived, because the atoms are imperceptible entities. In the present *sūtra*, Gautama notes how the opponent may try to answer this charge with the help of a new illustration. A person suffering from morbid vision cannot see a single hair due to the weakness of his eyes and the thinness of the hair ; yet he has no difficulty in seeing a mass of hairs, that is, when a number of hairs is clustered together. In the same way, the opponent contends, we may not be able to perceive one single atom ; still we may have the ability of perceiving an aggregate of atoms, that is, when many atoms stand conjoined with one another. Thus, it follows that when we seem to perceive an object we really perceive nothing but a particular aggregate of atoms and the question of admitting a distinct 'whole' does not arise.

Sūtra 14

[Answer] The soundness (*paṭubhāva*) or the deficiency (*mandabhāva*) of a sense-organ is [to be judged] only when it does not go beyond the range of its own specific object, and the distinctness or the indistinctness of the cognition of an object

is due to such [soundness or deficiency of a sense-organ]. And a sense-organ does never operate in respect of what is not its own specific object. // iv. 2.14 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The distinctness or the indistinctness of the cognitions of objects results from the soundness or the deficiency of the sense-organs only with reference to their own specific objects The visual sense-organ, though sound enough, never perceives smell which is not its own specific object and, again, even, if deficient, does not cease to operate in respect of its own specific object. Some particular person suffering from morbid vision—as has been referred to [in the previous *sūtra*]—does not perceive a single hair which is a specific object for the visual sense-organ, and yet he does perceive a mass of hairs. But both of them [i.e. a single hair as well as a mass of hairs] are perceived through the visual sense-organ by one who is not suffering from morbid vision. The atoms, on the other hand, are imperceptible, not of the nature of an object of a sense-organ and are never perceived by any sense-organ. [If it be claimed that] such atoms, when collected together, are perceived, there would follow the absurdity of a sense-organ operating in respect of what is not its own specific object, for [according to the opponent] no other entity [in the form of a 'whole'] distinct from [the mere collection of] the atoms is ever apprehended. [That is, in short, the opponent's explanation of the non-perception of a single atom and the perception of an aggregate of atoms on the analogy of the non-perception of a single hair and the perception of a mass of hairs by a person suffering from morbid vision is not justified, because hair is intrinsically perceptible, while an atom is intrinsically imperceptible.]

[Moreover, the opponent's view is vitiated by contradiction]. Now, these atoms, when conjoined with one another, are perceived and hence, cease to be imperceptible [i.e. become perceptible]. But, again, the same atoms, when disjoined from one another, are not perceived and hence, do not constitute an object of a sense-organ [i.e. become imperceptible]. Thus, if the production of a distinct substance [i.e. a 'whole' over and above the parts] is not admitted, there would result a grave contradiction, as has been shown above. It would, therefore, be only logical to maintain that there is produced a distinct substance [in the form of a 'whole'] which really constitutes the object of an apprehension [when one perceives anything like the jar etc.]

[Objection] If it be argued that just the 'mere collectivity' (*sañcayamātra*) is the object [of perception] ? [That is, to avoid the contradiction, it may be argued that even when the atoms are collected together, one does not perceive the atoms themselves ; what one perceives is just the collectivity.] [Answer] No. Such a

claim is illogical, because collectivity is really of the nature of conjunction and conjunction which is located in imperceptible substances is never perceived. To explain, collectivity really means the mutual conjunction of many substances and conjunction is perceived only if it is located in perceptible substances ; if it is located in imperceptible substances, it is not perceived. This is because one perceives conjunction in the form 'this [substance] is conjoined with that [substance]', [which presupposes also the perceptibility of the substances conjoined]. Therefore, it [i.e. the answar given by the opponent to the charge of contradiction] is illogical, [for the atoms being imperceptible entities their collectivity or mutual conjunction too must reamain equally so.]

[Nor can it be argued that an individual atom, though not really imperceptible, is not perceived due to the presence of some obstruction, like a jar shut off by a screen, for instance], because, the [admission of] some cause for the non-perception of an object in the form of an obstruction etc. is justified in the case of such an object only as is [observed, at least in a few occasions, to be] perceived by any of the sense-organs. [That is, a jar is not totally imperceptible, for experience proves that it can generally be perceived with the eyes. Hence, if in some particular case, it remains unperceived, its non-perception may be explained to be due to an obstruction. An atom, on the other hand, is totally imperceptible, for it is never perceived by anybody through any sense-organ. Hence, it is not logical to explain its non-perception to be due to an obstruction].

Therefore, the non-perception of the atoms is not due to any deficiency in the sense-organ, just as, the non-perception of smell and the like by the visual sense is not due to any dificiency in the sense-organ itself. [That is, smell is not perceived by the visual sense not because it is deficient but because smell lies outside its scope. In the same way, atoms are not perceived by any sense-organ, not because the sense-organ is deficient, but because atoms lie outside the range of all sense-organs. cf. also *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1.36]

Elucidation

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa points out that, under the present *sūtra* and also under *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1.36, Vātsyāyana criticises, with similar arguments, the position of the Vaibhāṣika Buddhists who upheld the theory of the aggregate of atoms. Some of the Buddhist philosophers subscribing to this theory, however, have finally contended that the atoms are always produced and destroyed as forming an aggregate—that is, as conjoined with one another—and never separately. In other words, according to them, though an atom, being momentary, is produced and destroyed every moment, it is never produced and destroyed in an isolated state having no conjunction with the other atoms. The perception of an individual or single atom, therefore, is not possible at all, because

an atom in its isolated or disjoined state has no existence whatsoever. From Kamalaśīla's remark in his commentary on the *Tattvasaṃgraha* of Śāntarakṣita, it is clear that Śubhagupta was an adherent of this view. Refuting it from his own Vijñānavāda standpoint, Śāntarakṣita says that, if it is admitted that only an aggregate of atoms—that is, a group of mutually conjoined atoms—is produced and is perceived as such in that form, the aggregate cannot be said to be partless (*niraṃśa*), for each of the consituent atoms would stand for what may be called its parts. If, on the other hand, the aggregate is considered to be partless, it cannot be corporeal (*mūrta*) and if it is not corporeal, it cannot be perceptible either. In other words, it is to be admitted that the aggregate must be something composite (*sāṃśa*) and corporeal. This, however, implies that the aggregate cannot be identified with the atoms. Thus, being forced to admit, in the form of the aggregate, something which is composite, corporeal and not identical with the atoms, the opponent will have to go against his own conclusion that nothing over and above the atoms exists.

Sūtra 15

[Answer continued] Moreover, the said difficulty (*prasaṅga*) relating to the 'whole' and the parts [viz. that the 'whole' cannot be present within the parts either entirely or through its segments, etc.] would continue till an 'absolute non-existence of all things' (*pralaya*) [i.e. would ultimately lead to an absolute non-existence of all things].

// iv. 2.15 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer continued] The non-existence [of the 'whole'] has been sought to be proved [by the opponent] on the ground of the unjustifiability of the presence of the 'whole' within the parts. But such non-existence may as well be made to apply to the case of the parts themselves, considering the parts in relation to their own component parts [in the same dilemmatic way as has been done in the case of the 'whole' and the parts] and [carried on further step by step] it would ultimately lead to an absolute non-existence of all things or it would come to an end on arriving at the atom which is partless. [That is, all things would be either proved to be non-existent or reduced to mere atoms.] In both ceses, there would remain nothing that may be said to constitute the object of perception, and due to the absence of the object of perception itself, there can be no perception either. But the unjustifiability of

the presence [of the 'whole' within the parts which is the ground of the opponent] is based on perception, and since it [ultimately leads to an absolute non-existence of all things or mere atoms and thereby] annihilates its own basis [i.e. negates the very possibility of perception], it can succeed only in annihilating its own self [i.e. it cannot prove the non-existence of the 'whole'].

Elucidation

The opponent has argued that the 'whole' does not exist because the 'whole' cannot be logically said to be present within the parts either in its entirety or through its segments. As against this, Gautama points out here that the argument of the opponent may equally be applied to the case of even the parts and it may be shown that, just like the 'whole', the parts too are non-existent, which would ultimately establish the non-existence of all objects. Thus, if the opponent denies the reality of the 'whole', but admits the reality of the parts, one may ask, following the opponent's own line of argument, wherein do these parts reside and in what manner ? On the assumption that a part resides in some other part, one may put a further question, namely, does a part reside in another part in its entirety or through its segment ? The opponent would be able to accede to neither of the alternatives and this would force him to accept the non-existence of the parts even. The opponent may however contend that, according to him, objects like the jar etc. are not composed of parts ; they represent merely some aggregates of the atoms and nothing more. Therefore, the question of the residence of a part within another part does not concern him at all. Foreseeing such a rejoinder, Vātsyāyana has referred to an alternative possibility, namely that the opponent's line of argument may also reduce finally all objects to mere atoms.

Pointing to the untenability of both the alternatives, Vātsyāyana says that the acceptance of either leads to the annihilation of perception as such, for a perception is never possible in the absence of the object to be perceived. Thus, if finally no object in the world be really existent what would stand for the object to be perceived ? If, on the other hand, every object be really nothing but a mere aggregate of atoms, how can it be an object of perception, the atoms being entities intrinsically imperceptible ? Moreover, the annihilation of perception as such implies also the impossibility of the other forms of knowledge which are all basically dependent upon perception. Thus, there being a total absence of perception as well as all the other forms of knowledge, the opponent cannot at all put forward his alternatives : does the 'whole' reside within the parts in its entirety or through its segments ? In other words, the contention of the opponent is self-destructive and hence, the unreality of the 'whole' cannot be established.

Bhāṣya

Besides—

Sūtra 16

[Answer continued] An absolute non-existence of all things is not possible, because an atom (*aṇu=paramāṇu*) remains [in the end]. // iv. 2.16 //

Bhāṣya

[Answar continued] The alleged non-existence [of the 'whole' as well as the parts further and further] on the ground of the unjustifiability of residence comes to an end after arriving at an atom which is partless, and thus, [because of the existence of the atoms] does not lead ultimately to an absolute non-existence of all things. The partlessness of an atom [follows from the fact that an atom represents] an entity compared to which nothing else can be smaller [and hence], in which the possibility of getting smaller and smaller due to further and further division [of the parts] is ended. [For instance, the pieces of] an earth-clod (*loṣṭa*) which is being divided into parts [further and further] become smaller and smaller, step by step. But such a possibility of getting smaller and smaller is ended after a piece is arrived at compared to which no other piece can be [conceived to be] smaller, i.e. which is minute to the utmost degree. Thus, what we call by term 'atom' is an entity compared to which nothing else can be smaller. [That is, an atom represents the minutest particle of a substance, which admits of no further division.]

Elucidation

In the preceding *sūtra*, Gautama has contended that the opponent's argument put forward to establish the non-existence of the 'whole', if carried on to its furthest limit, would lead to an absolute non-existence of all things or *pralaya*. The opponent may, however, point out that in the end there remain the atoms and hence, the question of *pralaya* does not arise. In the present *sūtra*, Gautama too concurs with the oponent so far as the reality of the atoms, the ultimate constituents of all substances, and the consequent absence of *pralaya* are concerned. However, the illogicality of admitting atoms only and nothing else in the form of the 'whole' has already been explained by Vātsyāyana under the preceding *sūtra*.

Both *sūtra*-s 15 and 16 have been explained by Vātsyāyana as *siddhānta-sūtra*-s representing Gautama's answers to the opponent. Viśvanātha, the author of the *Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti*, however, explains them also in an alternative way as representing respectively the opponent's contention and Gautama's answer to it. Thus, according to this interpretation, in *sūtra* 15, the opponent contends that those who accept the reality of the 'whole' would have to admit a continuous series of part and 'whole' till 'cosmic

dissolution' (*pralaya*). But, since in the state of cosmic dissolution all things are totally destroyed, there can be no further creation afterwards. In answer, Gautama says in *Sūtra* 16 that in the state of cosmic dissolution all things cannot be said to be annihilated, since the partless and eternal atoms continue to exist.

It is to be noted that although the word *aṇu* is used sometimes to mean an imperceptible dyad (*dvyaṇuka*) produced from the conjunction of two atoms or sometimes a very minute perceptible substance (cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* iii.1.33), in the present *sūtra*, as is quite evident from the context, it has been used here in the sense of *paramāṇu* or an atom which is imperceptible, partless and indivisible.

Sūtra 17

[An atom represents what] lies [in the continuous process of dividing a substance into parts] beyond the triad (*truṭi*= *trasareṇu*). // iv. 2.17 //

Bhāṣya

If the proces of division into parts does not come to rest anywhere, all [composite] substances would be composed of a countless number of parts, and thus, [a triad] would have to forsake its very 'nature of being a triad' (*truṭitva*). [That is, if the process of division may be continued endlessly, even a triad which is accepted to be the smallest perceptible substance would be composed of an unlimited number of parts and as such, would no longer remain a very small substance.]

Elucidation

It has been said that the process of division terminates at an atom. To this, it may be asked, since every part in its turn is observed to be subdivided into further and further parts, why not admit that even an atom has got component parts and is divisible, and there is no limit to the process of division ? In answer, Gautama describes the nature of an atom in the present *sūtra*, which, as Vātsyāyana clearly brings out, contains implicitly the argument why the process of division is to be terminated at a point beyond the triad. (Thus, the ultimate state is represented by an atom which is partless and indivisible, the penultimate by a dyad which is formed by the combination of two atoms only, and the next upwards by a triad which is formed by the combination of three dyads only. An atom or a dyad is not visible. A triad is the smallest form of a gross body visible to the eye.)

In this context, Uddyotakara says that, if there be no limit to divisibility, even a triad which is actually a very small substance would become immeasurable (*ameya*)—it

would not be possible to determine specifically its magnitude, weight, and the number of atoms it is composed of—due to the fact that, just like the mountain Himālaya, a triad also would be made up of an unlimited number of atoms. Thus, there would follow the absurdity that a triad also being as immeasurable as the vast Himālaya. Vācaspati Miśra comments that, if a limit to divisibility is denied, both a triad and a mountain would be equal in magnitude, for, in that case, the component parts of both would be unlimited in number and it would not be possible to justify the difference in their respective magnitude by referring to the varying number of their respective component parts, which, in fact, presupposes the admission that the process is to be discontinued at some point beyond the triad.

According to some, the word *truṭi* is used in the present *sūtra* in the sense of a dyad or *dvyaṇuka* and the implication of the *sūtra* is that, in the process of division, an atom comes just after a dyad, that is, an atom represents the exact half of a dyad. Though such an interpretation makes the meaning of the *sūtra* more coherent, it cannot be accepted, because there is no reliable evidence to justify the use of the word *truṭi* in such a sense. Authoritative commentators like Vācaspati Miśra and others take the word in the sense of a triad or *trasareṇu*. According to them, two atoms mutually conjoined give rise to a dyad and three such mutually conjoined atoms form a triad which represents the smallest visible substance. A triad is generally described as the very minute dust-particle seen floating in a sun-beam penetrating through the window-hole. (cf. *Manusaṃhitā* viii. 132 ; *Yājñavalkyasamhitā*, *ācārādhyāya*, Rājadharmaprakaraṇa, verse 360 and Aparārka thereon ; also *Śrīmadbhāgavata* iii. 11.1 and the comments of Śrīdharasvāmin, Vijayadhvajatīrtha, Vallabhācārya and Viśvanātha Cakravartin thereon.)

Viśvanātha finally takes the word *vā* of the *sūtra* in the sense of 'alternatively' (*vikalpa*) and explains that Gautama here refers to two alternatives, namely, the process of division terminates at the atom whieh is minuter than a triad or the process of division terminates at the triad itself. Radhāmohana Gosvāmin, the author of the *Nyāya-sūtra-vivaraṇa*, repeats *in toto* what Viśvanātha says and refers to a novel explanation which he ascribes to the Navyas. According to it, the word *para* in the present *sūtra* stands for the substance which is the first and foremost to come into being when the process of creation starts afresh after a cosmic dissolution. Thus, the implication of the *sūtra* is that the first substance created after a cosmic dissoulution has for its material cause the triad and there is no evidence to show that the triad too is composed of parts. Evidently, the later commentators were prompted to take up such a line of interpretation following Raghunātha who, in his *Padārtha-tattva-nirūpaṇa*, had argued that the ultimate constituents of the material substances were the triad which themselves were to be considered partless and eternal, and there was no need to postulate the further stages of a dyad and an atom.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa, however, points out that the view of Raghunātha definitely contradicts the position of Gautama who undoubtedly admits the reality of the imper-

ceptible atoms (cf. *Nyāya-sūtra* ii. 1.36). Nor can it be contended that, as a final alternative, Gautama here accepts the triad as the ultimate element in place of the atom, for, in that case, his argument against the denier of the 'whole'—that if all objects be just an aggregate of atoms and there be no 'whole' over and above, no object would ever be visible—cannot stand due to the fact that, the triad being the ultimate constituent, every object would have to be equated to an aggregate of triads only and each triad being intrinsically visible, such an aggregate too would be quite visible. In fact, Gautama would thus be left without any argument for upholding the existence of the 'whole' as distinct from a mere collection of parts. Besides, Kaṇāda and the *Carakasaṃhitā* also clearly refer to the imperceptibility of the atom and Viśvanātha, in another treatise of his own, the *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, defends Gautama's admission of the atom after criticising the theory of Raghunātha.

It is moreover to be noted that the theory ascribed above to Raghunātha was not one originally propounded by him, because, from Uddyotakara's remark in the *Nyāyavārttika*, it appears that some followers of the Vātsīputra sect of the Vaibhāṣika Buddhists identified the triad itself with the minutest particle or a *paramāṇu* and urged against the position of Gautama that the charge of imperceptibility of objects was not to be levelled against their veiw, since, according to them, objects like the jar etc. were each an aggregate of visible triads only. Refuting this view, Uddyotakara says that a triad cannot be equated to a *paramāṇu*, because a triad being composed of parts is divisible, while a *paramāṇu* is partless as well as indivisible. That a triad is composed of parts follows from the fact that an object, subject to perception through an external sense-organ, is invariably made up of parts. The argument has been thus represented in the form of an inference : a triad is composed of parts, because it is a substance subject to visual perception, as for instance, the jar. Again, the parts of a triad (viz. the dyads or *dvyaṇuka*-s) too must be made up of further parts (viz. the atoms or *paramāṇu*-s), for a triad is a visible substance and from the instances of the jar etc. it is established that the component part of a substance subject to visual perception is also itself composed of further parts. However, it would not be wise to go further and and seek to prove in a similar manner further parts even for the 'parts of the triad-parts' (i.e. an atom which is the component part of a dyad, which, in its turn, is the component part of a triad), inasmuch as, in that case, the process of division would go on endlessly and as has already been pointed out, there would follow the absurdity of a mustard seed and a mountain having an equal magnitude.

While discussing the Vaiśeṣika theory of atoms in the *Bhāmatī* (under *Brahma-sūtra* ii.2.11), Vācaspati Miśra explains the admission of the successive stages of a dyad and a triad in the following manner. Atoms themselves cannot directly constitute the material cause of a substance. If, for instance, the very atoms themselves representing the ultimate basic elements of the jar are considered to be the material causes of the jar, it is alsso to be admitted that when the jar is broken up by the blow

of a hammer all the atoms or the material causes of the jar stand totally disjoined from one another. Otherwise, the destruction of the jar at that moment cannot be explained, inasmuch as a produced substance is never destroyed unless its material causes themselves are destroyed or stand separated from one another. If, however, a complete disintegration of the atoms of the jar is said to result immediately after the blow of a hammer, the jar being reduced to a mere heap of atoms at the moment, nothing visible to the eye would remain, since the atoms are all intrinsically imperceptible. The fact, on the contrary, is that, even after a jar has been broken up, small fragments of various sizes are actually visually perceived. Thus, it is to be admitted that, when a jar is broken up, the ultimate atoms themselves do not become all disintegrated and as such, these atoms themselves do not directly constitute the material causes of the jar. From the same fact—that many atoms cannot directly constitute the material causes of a substance—it follows that the direct combination of three atoms also cannot lead to the formation of a substance, for 'three' is equivalent to 'many'. Therefore, the only logical alternative would be to maintain that at the initial stage only two atoms combine themselves leading to the formation of a new substance in the form of a dyad. Again, there is no justification for admitting the production of a new substance also from the combination of two dyads only, because such a new substance, if there be any, would essentially be of the nature of a dyad only and not anything having a gross magnitude. This is due to the fact that neither of the causes producing grossness (*sthūlatva*) or intermediate magnitude (*mahat-parimāṇa*) in a produced substance—viz. the intermediate magnitude of the material causes and the plurality (*yahutva*) of their number, etc.—is possible in a combination of two dyads, for two dyads—the material causes of the combination—are characterised (being two in number and atomic in magnitude) neither by plurality nor by intermediate magnitude nor by a specific form of loose conjunction (*pracaya*). Thus, it is to be concluded that first a substance in the form of a dyad is brought about by the combination of two atoms only and next, from the combination of three such dyads there comes about a newer substance in the form of a triad (*tryaṇuka=trasareṇu*), Since three dyads are characterised by plurality, a triad formed by their combination can become gross and acquire intermediate magnitude (and hence, becomes visible). In the same manner, grosser substances in the form of a tetrad (*caturaṇuka*) etc. may be formed from the combination of four dyads etc.

HIRE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE REALITY OF THE PART AND THE WHOLE

(*avayavāvayavi-prakaraṇa*)

III. On the reality of a partless entity (atom).

Bhāṣya

And now the Ānupalambhika who thinks that all is non-existent contends—

Sūtra 18

[Objection] An atom [as a partless entity] cannot be logically established, because there is penetration (*vyatibheda*) by *ākāśa*. // iv.2.18 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] An atom as a partless entity cannot be logically established. Why? Because of penetration by *ākāśa*. *Ākāśa* pervades the inside (*antaḥ*) as well as the outside (*bahiḥ*) of an atom, and hence, an atom is penetrated by *ākāśa*. Since it is penetrated, it is 'composed of parts' (*sāvayava*) and, since it is composed of parts, it is non-eternal.

Elucidation

In the Nyāya view, *ākāśa* being an ubiquitous substance must be conjoined with the inside as well as the outside of an atom. The inside and the outside of an atom however mean nothing but its component parts. Hence, an atom too is to be admitted as composed of parts ; it cannot be partless.

Sūtra 19

[Objection] Otherwise *ākāśa* would not be ubiquitous. // iv.2.19 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] If, on the other hand, the above is not accepted, that is, [if it is denied] that *ākāśa* is present within an atom, it would lead to an absurd position, namely, *ākāśa* is not ubiquitous.

Sūtra 20

[Answer] The terms 'inside' (*antaḥ*) and 'outside' (*bahiḥ*) refer to certain causes of a 'produced substance' (*kārya-dravya*) and hence, they are not applicable to what is not a product. // iv.2.20 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The term 'inside' refers to [a substance's material] causes [i.e. the component parts lying in the middle] which are separated by certain other [material] causes [i.e. by the component parts occupying the periphery]. Again, the term 'outside' refers to [a substance's material] causes [i.e. the component parts occupying the periphery]. Again, the term 'outside' refers to [a substance's material] causes [i.e. the component parts occupying the periphery] which separate others [i.e. the component parts lying in the middle], but are not themselves separated. [In short, *antaḥ* refers to the parts situated in the middle and *bahiḥ* to the parts situated at the outer limit]. And all these are possible only in the case of a produced substance, but not in the case of an atom, since an atom is not a product. In the case of an atom which is not a product [i.e. is not produced through a combination of parts], there is nothing which may be referred to as 'inside' or 'outside'. The things in the case of which such references are possible are the substances [like the dyad etc.] which are really the products of atoms, and not the atoms themselves. An atom is a substance anything smaller than which is inconceivable.

Elucidation

The implication of Gautama's answer is that the probans offered by the opponent to prove the compositeness of an atom—penetration by *ākāśa*—is unproved in the case of an atom. According to the opponent, penetration by *ākāśa* means the conjunction of *ākāśa* with the inside or inner portion and the outside or outer portion of an atom. But an atom being eternal or uncaused as well as partless has got neither an inner portion nor an outer portion. The question of their conjunction with *ākāśa* therefore does not arise, for a conjuction with an absolute non-entity is never possible.

Uddyotakara has made a detailed criticism of the opponent here. What exactly is the meaning of 'penetration by *ākāśa*' alleged to be the ground proving the non-eternality of an atom ? First, it cannot be taken to mean simply a relation between an atom and *ākāśa*, for simply having a relation with *ākāśa* would not establsish the non-eternality of the atom. Secondly, it cannot mean a relation with the inner portion or some specific part of an atom, for an atom is an uncaused substance and has no part. Thirdly, it cannot mean the disjunction of the parts of an atom caused by *ākāśa*, for the disjunction of the parts of an atom which is partless and is not a produced substance is an impossibility. Fourthly, even if it be admitted that an atom has parts, *ākāśa* cannot be said to be the cause of their disjunction, for disjunction is produced by movement. In short, whatever may be the meaning of 'penetration by *ākāśā*', the opponent can in no way prove his point. Besides, there is no problem in explaining the ubiquity of *ākāśa*, for there is in fact a conjunction between *ākāśa* and an atom which is a 'corporeal substance' (*mūrta-dravya*). Absence of *ākāśa* inside an atom

does not disprove the ubiquity of *ākāśa*. An atom is a partless entity and has neither 'inside' nor 'outside'; ubiquity does not mean pervading even what is non-existent.

Sūtra 21

[*Ākāśa* is] ubiquitous, because sounds (*śabda*) and conjuntions (*saṃyoga*) are [observed to] originate everywhere [as located in *ākāśa*]. // iv.2.21 //

Bhāṣya

Wherever sounds are produced, they are produced, in every case, within *ākāśa*; that is, all of them have *ākāśa* for their substratum. Moreover, the conjunctions of all the minds (*manas*), all the atoms and all the substances produced from them are observed to originate in *ākāśa*. No corporeal (*mūrta*) substance as disjoined from *ākāśa* is ever observed. Therefore, *ākāśa* is not non-ubiquitous.

Elucidation

Sounds are observed to originate anywhere and everywhere, in all possible parts of space. But *ākāśa* must be present wherever sounds originate, for *ākāśa* is the inherent couse of sound. Thus, *ākāśa* must be present everywhere or is ubiquitous. Similarly, the ubiquity of *ākāśa* is proved also by its conjunction with various corporeal substances. Of the nine substances recognised by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, four kinds of atoms, their products and mind or *manas* are admitted to be corporeal. All these corporeal substances (occupying various points of space) are invariably conjoined with *ākāśa*. Hence, *ākāśa* must be ubiquitous. A conjunction of *ākāśa* with the inside or the outside of an atom is not possible simply because an atom has got no such part. This does not however prevent *ākāśa* from being conjoined with an atom and thus the ubiquity of *ākāśa* is not disproved.

According to Uddyotakara, the reading of the present *sūtra* is : *sarvasaṃyoga-śabda-vibhavāc ca sarvagatam*. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa however points out that the reading he has accepted (along with Vācaspati, Viśvanātha and Rādhāmohana Gosvāmin) is clearly indicated by Vātsyāyana's interpretation.

Sūtra 22

However, 'unchangeability of structure' (*avyūha*), 'non-obstruction of movement' (*aviṣṭambha*) and ubiquity (*vibhutva*) are the essential characteristics of *ākāśa*. // iv.2.22 //

Bhāṣya

The structure of *ākāśa* remains unchanged even when a substance moving violently strikes against it. [It is not so in the case of other substances]. For instance, [the previous structure of] water [is disturbed] by a log [thrown into it]. Why ? Because [*ākāśa*] is not composed of parts.

Again, *ākāśa* does not obstruct the movement of a substance moving violently and striking against it, i.e. does not impede the quality [viz. velocity or *vega*] that causes movement in a substance. Why ? Because [*ākāśa*] is not characterised by touch. Obstruction of movement is observed in the opposite [i.e. in the substances characterised by touch].

And now you [the opponent] are not justified in imputing the properties observed in a substance characterised by touch to what is opposed to it [i.e. a substance not characterised by touch].

Elucidation

Some objections may be raised against the ubiquity of *ākāśa*. *Ākāśa* is said to be a substance which is present everywhere. How is it then that its structure remains intact even when another substance pounds on it violently ? It is observed, for instance, that a log thrown into the water disturbs the existing surface of the water and there appear new series of waves. Again, how is it that *ākāśa* does not retard or put an end to the movement of a substance speedily coming up against it, like a wall standing in the way, for instance, hindering further progress of a person ? Answering these objections in the present *sūtra*, Gautama asserts that unchangeability of structure and non-obstruction of movement are the natural properties of *ākāśa*. This, as Vātsyāyana adds by way of explanation, is due to the fact that *ākāśa* is a substance neither composed of parts nor characterised by the quality of touch. A change of structure or a different arrangement of the component parts is possible only in the case of composite substances and the obstruction of one substance by another can occur only when both are characterised by the quality of touch.

Bhāṣya

The effecthood [i.e. the compositeness] of an atom is negated by the absurdity that, in that case, the component parts of an atom would have to be still smaller. If an atom is assumed to be made up of parts, there follows the absurdity that the component parts of an atom are still smaller [i.e. even smaller than an atom]. Why ? Because it is observed that there is a difference in the magnitudes of the 'substance representing the effect' (*kārya-dravya*) and the 'substance representing the cause' (*kāraṇa-dravya*). Therefore, the componet parts of an atom would have to be still smaller. [This is however absurd, for an atom is the smallest conceivable unit]. [The fact on the contrary is that an atom, being partless, cannot be an

effect or a composite substance ; but] whatever composite substances there are they are all the products of atoms. Therefore, [the opponent's thesis that] an atom is an effect is disproved.

The non-eternality [i.e. destruction] of a composite substance is due to the disjunction of its [material] causes [i.e. the parts], and not to penetration by *ākāśa*. [For instance], a clod (*loṣṭa*) is [proved to be] non-eternal—not because it is permeated by *ākāśa*—but because its compoent parts can be disjoined.

Elucidation

The opponent may contend that an atom cannot be non-eternal, for all the objects we come across in this world are observed to be effects or products. Thus, even if there be some entity known as an atom, it also must be an effect. In other words, the non-eternality of an atom may be established by an inference : an atom is non-eternal, because it is an effect, just like a pot. Foreseeing such an objection, Vātsyāyana here replies that an atom cannot be an effect or a product and thus, the ground of the opponent's inference remains unproved. Vātsyāyana argues that if an atom were an effect, it must also have some component parts as its material or inherent causes. But then, since the component parts or the material causes and the substance produced by them are always observed to be varying in magnitude—the former being smaller and the latter being larger, one has got to admit further that the component parts of an atom are smaller than the atom itself. Such an admission however would imply that even the parts of an atom have got parts of their own which are still smaller, and these parts, in their turn, can have parts still smaller ; the process would go on further and further and one would have to admit an infinite number of very minute substances, without any rest anywhere with the result that ultimately, nothing can be spoken of as the smallest substance—a substance smaller than which nothing is conceivable. Thus, there would follow the fallacy of infinite regress and the absurdity of the Sumeru mountain and the mustard-seed being equal in magnitude.

Lastly, Vātsyāyana notes that an atom is indestructible too. A produced substance is destroyed when its component parts disintegrate ; it is not destroyed because of penetration by *ākāśa*. An atom being partless the question of the disjunction of its parts does not arise. Hence, an atom is indestructible.

Sūtra 23

[Objection] However, an atom also has got parts, because all substances 'possessing limited magnitude and the quality of touch' (*mūrtimat*) are observed to have specific configurations (*saṃsthāna*). // iv.2.23 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Substances possessing limited magnitude and the quality of touch are observed to have various distinct configurations, such as triangular (*trikoṇa*), quadrangular (*caturasra*), uniform (*sama*) or globular (*parimaṇḍala*). And such a specific configuration [of a substance] means nothing but a specific arrangement of its component parts. The atoms have a globular configuration. Hence, they must be composed of parts.

Sūtra 24

[Objection] [An atom must be composed of parts], also because the conjunction [of one atom with other atoms] is possible. // iv.2.24 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] An atom in the central position when conjoined to two other atoms standing on its eastern and western sides respectively separates them from each other. From such separation it is inferred that the eastern portion of the [middle] atom is conjoined with the atom standing on the eastern side and the western portion of it is conjoined with the atom standing on the western side. And these two portions (*bhāga*)—the eastern and the western—are nothing but the two component parts (*avayava*) of the said atom. Similarly, since an atom can get conjoined with other atoms on all sides [i e. above, below and such other positions], it must have distinct portions—i.e. component parts—on all sides.

Elucidation

Uddyotakara explains the position of the opponent here by quoting a famous verse from Vasubandhu's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* (viz. *ṣaṭkena yugapad yogāt paramāṇoḥ ṣaḍaṃśatā / ṣaṇṇāṃ samānadeśatvāt piṇḍaḥ syād aṇumātrakaḥ //*). The opponent contends that there is no denying the fact that since an atom can be conjoined at the same moment with six other atoms coming from six different directions (north, south, east, west, up and down), it must be possessed of six parts. Six conjunctions cannot occur at one and the same point ; different conjunctions occur only at different points. On the other hand, if it be admitted that all the six conjunctions occur at one and the same point of the atom, the substance resulting from the combination of these seven atoms would be nothing more than a mere atom, i.e. would not acquire grossness, but remain atomic in magnitude. As such, it can neither be visible. If an atom is conceived as possessed of many parts or segments (*pradeśa*), then only the substance resulting

from the conjunctions of an atom with many other atoms can acquire greater extension or larger proportion. As a matter of fact, many conjunctions cannot be effected at one and the same point. An atom is however observed to have conjunctions with many other atoms simultaneously. Hence, it cannot be a partless entity.

Vasubandhu, a logician of the Vijñānavāda school of Buddhists, has strongly criticised the two other schools of Buddhists, the Sautrāntikas and the Vaibhāṣikas, who admitted the reality of external objects as distinct from mere consciousness or *vijñāna* and with a view to establishing the unreality of external objects as well as the realily of *vijñāna* alone points to, in his *Viṃśatikā-kārikā*, many inconsistencies involved in the conception of an atom. As against the. Vaibhāṣikas, he argues that the alleged external object cannot be said to be a single entity in the form of a 'whole' (*avayavin*) as is claimed by the Vaiśeṣikas (the various schools of Buddhists are unanimous in rejecting the 'whole' as distinct from the parts or *avayava*-s) ; it can also be considered neither as just 'many atoms' (*aneka-paramāṇu*) nor as atoms in a 'compact form' (*saṃhata*). Why ? For the simple reason that nothing in the form of an atom can be logically established. How is it that an atom cannot be established logically ? Vasubandhu records the objections in the verse *ṣaṭkena yugapad yogāt* etc. (which has already been explained above). The Kāśmīrīya Vaibhāṣikas in defence of their position argue that the conjunction of one aggregate of atoms with another aggregate of the same (and not of one atom with another) is quite possible. To this, Vasubandhu says that conjunction with an individual atom being an impossibility no conjunction can really be effected among their aggregates too.

Śāntarakṣita, a logician also belonging to the Vijñānavāda school, but much later than Vasubndhu, refers, in his *Tattvasaṃgraha*, to some of the arguments of Vasubandhu rejecting the conception of an atom and further explains that whatever shares the property of neither 'one' (*eka*) nor 'many' (*aneka*) is a non-entity, for instance, a lotus blooming in the sky. An atom too can be characterised as neither 'one' nor 'many' and hence, it is non-existent. The atomists may point out that, according to them, an atom is 'one' and not 'many'. To this, Śāntarakṣita objects, just like Vasubandhu, that an atom cannot be considered 'one', since every atom has got difference (*bheda*) in relation to the various directions (*digbhāga*) like up, down etc.

Kamalaśīla, the celebrated commentator of *Tattvasaṃgraha*, refers, while discussing and refuting the Vaibhāṣika standpoint, to three different schools of Vaibhāṣika atomists. According to the first of them, the atoms occur invariably as conjoined (*saṃyukta*) with one another. Others conclude that the atoms always occur 'with a very close interval among themselves' (*sāntara*), i.e. [though very proximate] the atoms do not touch one another. The opinion of yet another school is that when the close interval among the atoms disappears, the atoms are called 'touched' (*spṛṣṭa*). As against all the three views, it is urged that when the atom in the central position is surrounded by many other atoms, it must be admitted to have difference in relation to the different

directions. Otherwise, there can be no accumulation (*pracaya*) or 'gross magnitude' (*sthūlatā*), for, according to the atomists, an atom is partless.

Bhāṣya

[It has been objected that] an atom also has got parts, because all substances having limited magnitude and the quality of touch are observed to have distinct configuration. [The answer to this] has been stated. What is [the answer] stated ? [It has been stated under *sūtra* 16 that an atom represents the smallest substance] at which the possibility of getting smaller and smaller due to further and further division of parts is ended ; and also [under *sūtra* 22] : the effecthood [i.e. the compositeness] of an atom is negated by the absurdity that, in that case, the component parts of an atom would have to be still smaller.

Again, it has been further objected that [an atom is composed of parts] also because the conjunction [of one atom with other atoms] is possible. [The answer to this] also has been stated, [which is as follows :] separation (*vyavadhāna*) [of the atoms on the eastern and the western sides by the atom in the middle] is due to possession of touch and there being no pervasion of the substraum (*āśraya*), [an atom] merely appears to be divided into parts (*bhāga*) [but it is not really so]. To explain, when an atom possessing the quality of touch comes up against two other atoms possessing the quality of touch, the one separates the other two from each other [because of their possession of touch] and not because an atom is composed of parts. Thus, there being separation due to the possession of touch, the conjunction of an atom does not pervade its substratum and hence, there is an appearance of division into parts, i.e. one gets the notion as if an atom is possessed of parts. In this regard, it has already been stated [that an atom represents the smallest substance at which] the possibility of getting smaller and smaller due to further and further division of parts is ended; and also that the effecthood [i.e. the compositeness] of an atom is negated by the absurdity that, in that case, the component part of an atom would have to be still smaller.

Elucidation

Before Gautama himself answers, in the following *sūtra*, the charges levelled against the conception of an atom given in *sūtra*-s 23-24, Vātsyāyana here offers arguments of his own to refute the same.

As to the objection raised by *sūtra* 23, Vatsyāyana says that the answer is already given in his remarks under *sūtra*-s 16 and 22. Under *sūtra* 16 he explains why an atom is conceived to be partless. It is observed that when a composite substance is divided into parts further and further, the parts gradually get smaller and smaller. But this process of getting smaller and smaller must terminate at some point. In other words, it is to be admitted that such a process reaches the limit when one arrives at a substance

nothing smaller than which is possible—a substance which is minute to the utmost degree. This entails the further admission that such a substance is partless, for even if such a substance is assumed to be composed of parts it cannot represent the ultimate point where the process of division finally comes to an end. Nor can it be claimed that the process of getting smaller and smaller continues interminably, for it would inevitably lead to the fallacy of infinite regress.

Again, under *sūtra* 22, Vātsyāyana says that if an atom is assumed to have parts, those parts would have to be smaller than the atom itself. Those parts of an atom, again, being composite, would be reducible to still smaller parts and the process would go on further and further. The non-eternality or compositeness of an atom however cannot be established thus by assuming an infinite number of parts and further parts, for in that case there remains nothing that can be denoted by the term *paramāṇu (parama+aṇu)*, which stands for a substance anything smaller than which is inconceivable—a substance minute to the utmost degree. Thus, what is to be termed *paramāṇu* must be accepted to be something without parts.

In short, it has been conclusively proved by the above unrefutable arguments that an atom is partless. Since it is partless, it can have no configuration. As such, the ground given by the opponent to establish the compositeness of an atom—possession of a specific configuration—is unproved in the case of an atom and hence, inconclusive.

Answering the other objection given in *sūtra* 24, Vātsyāyana says that the separation of two atoms on the eastern and the western sides by the atom in the central position does not prove that they are composed of parts, for their separation can be explained by their possession of the quality of touch. When two substances with the quality of touch find place on either side of a substance with the quality of touch they are separated by the one in the middle and such separation has nothing to do with the possession of parts. However, it is observed, in the case of various composite substances, that when a conjunction occurs between two of them, it does not pervade the whole of the substances. In the same way, a conjunction between two atoms also does not pervade the atoms. Because of such similarity between an atom and a composite substance, an atom merely appears to be possessed of parts. In reality however an atom can have no part.

Bhāṣya

The atoms are [to be admitted as] composed of parts, "because all substances possessing limited magnitude and the quality of touch are observed to have specific configurations" and "also because the conjunction [of one atom with other atoms] is possible"—these two grounds [of the opponent]—

Sūtra 25

[Answer] Do not disprove [the partlessness of an atom], because they lead to 'infinite regress' (*anavasthā*) and such infinite regress cannot be logically justified. // iv. 2.25 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] Whatever is characterised by limited magnitude and the quality of touch or can be conjoined with something is invariably composed of parts—these two grounds [i.e. possession of limited magnitude and touch as well as capability of being conjoined] are grounds leading to infinite regress. And such infinite regress cannot be logically justified. If it were possible to justify such infinite regress, these two grounds would have been real grounds. Therefore, this [i.e. the opponent's contention] does not disprove the partlessness [of an atom].

Nor can it be maintained logically that, in the process of division, the object that is divided disappears ultimately. Hence, it is illogical to claim [that the process of division] ends in an 'absolute non-existence of things' (*pralaya*) [instead of a partless entity in the form of an atom].

If however an infinite regress is accepted every substance would be constituted of an infinite number of parts, and hence, the difference in the magnitudes [of various substances] as well as specific weight (*gurutva*) [of a substance] can never be ascertained. Moreover, [if an atom is said to be possessed of parts], there arises the absurdity of the part (*avayava*) and whole (*avayavin*) having an equal magnitude subsequent to the division of an atom into parts.

Elucidation

The opponent has advanced two grounds to prove the compositeness and non-eternality of an atom : (i) possession of a specific configuration and (ii) capability of being conjoined with something else. In the present *sūtra* Gautama contends that these two cannot prove their point, because they lead to infinite regress. Explaining the implication of Gautama, Vātsyāyana says that if one seeks to prove the compositeness of an atom with the above two grounds adhering to the invariable concomitance 'whatever has limited magnitude and touch is composed of parts' and 'whatever gets conjoined with something else is composed of parts', one would be forced to admit, on the same ground, further parts for the parts of an atom, which, again, will have to be composed of still further parts, and the process would continue without any rest anywhere. It may be pointed out that infinite regress is not always a defect ; if it can be justified by a *pramāṇa*, it does not amount to a vitiating factor. Foreseeing such a rejoinder, Vātsyāyana adds that infinite regress, in the present case, has no logical justification.

As against the above, the opponent may reply that, in his view also, the process of division is not endless ; it ends in an absolute non-existence of the thing being divided. When a composite substance is being divided further and further into smaller and smaller parts, there comes a stage when no further division is possible due to the fact that nothing remains there. Vātsyāyana rejects the reply by pointing out that division without the divisible is impossible. If there remains nothing ultimately, in what substratum or substance will the final division or disjunction reside ? Hence, something must remain even in the end and, in the opponent's view, it also being similarly divisible, there will be no escape from infinite regress.

The opponent may still try to stick to his point by claiming that, there being no other alternative, one has got to accept infinte regress. What is the harm ? Vātsyāyana therefore concludes his explanation by indicating the absurdities involved in the admission of infinite regress. First, if infinite regress is accepted, every substance admitting of endless division would be equally composed of an infinite number of parts and it would not be possible to determine the differences in the magnitudes and weights of the various substances, for such difference is determined by the greater or smaller number of their component parts. Secondly, if an atom is conceived to be composite and the gradual division of its parts is admitted, then even the parts themselves would be constituted of an infinite number of parts. Thus, there would remain no difference in the magnitudes of the whole and the parts. This is however contradicted by experience, for a part is always observed to be smaller than the whole substance.

There is thus no escape from vicious infinite regress and hence, the opponent is unable to prove the compositeness of an atom.

Uddyotakara makes a detailed examination of the arguments of the opponents of atomism and defends the partlessness of an atom. When does the process of division come to an end ? Uddyotakara points out that only three answers are possible in this regard : (i) the process terminates at an atom ; (ii) the process ends in an absolute non-existence of things, and (iii) the process is endless. The second alternative is untenable, because division without the divisible is not possible. The third one too is unacceptable, for it leads to the absurdity of a mountain and a mustard-seed being equal in magnitude. Out of logical necessity therefore one has got to accept the remaining alternative that an atom is the smallest substance : it admits of no further division and is partless. Thus, the opponent would not be able to put forward any inference to prove the compositeness of an atom, since the very 'statement of the thesis' (*pratijñā*), namely, 'an atom is composite'—amounting to 'a partless entity is composed of parts'—would involve self-contradiction and become meaningless.

Answering to the objections raised by Vasubandhu (in the verse *ṣaṭkena*

yugapad yogāt etc.), Uddyotakara says that, in the instance of one atom in the central position having conjunctions with six other atoms coming in from six different directions, if we consider by taking two of them only at a time, then the conjunction of the central atom with the eastern atom would occur only in the two of them, and would not extend upto the western atom. In the same way, the conjunction of the central atom with the western atom would occur only in the two of them and would not extend upto the eastern atom too. Thus all the conjunctions would occur at different points and the absurdity of the conjunctions being coincident does not arise. On the other hand, even if all the conjunctions of the six atoms are admitted to occur simultaneously in the central atom itself, there is no question of considering the central atom as possessed of parts, for the conjunctions, in such a case, may very well occur at the same point. The contingency of the resulting substance having atomic magnitude does not arise, because, though the conjunctions may be coincident (*samānadeśa*), the combining atoms all occupy different points of space.

Vasubandhu, in another vese of his *Viṃśatikākārikā* (*dig-bhāga-bhedo yasyāsti* etc.), notes some further objections against the conception of an atom. He argues that an atom has different 'spatial divisions' (*digbhāga*) pertaining to it, such as, the eastern direction (*pūrva-digbhāga*), the downward direction (*adhodigbhāga*) and so on. This however implies that an atom will necessarily split it up into a number of component parts corresponding to those spatial divisions. An atom therefore cannot be one. If each and every atom does not have difference due to spatial divisons, how is it, then, that, on sunrise, some places remain under shadows, but some places are flooded with light ? There can be no shadow unless an atom has got different parts and one atom cannot be covered up by another atom unless there is difference due to spatial divisions. If an atom is said to have no other part, there can be no accumulation (*pratighāta*) due to the conjunction of another atom in that part, and if there is no accumulation, all the atoms would occupy the same point of space as a result of which the aggregate of atoms even would remain atomic in magnitude instead of constituting something gross. In short, if it is admitted that each atom has difference due to spatial divisions, i.e. if, because of the conjunctions on the six directions, individual differences in an atom are accepted, it would amount to accepting six atoms actually. Therefore, no atom can be one.

Replying to the above, Uddyotakara says that the phenomena of 'casting a shadow' (*chāyā*) and covering (*āvaraṇa*) are due to a substance's possession of limited magnitude and the quality of touch ; they have nothing to do with the presence or absence of component parts. It is observed that a substance is covered by another substance possessing limited magnitude and the quality of touch. Covering means preventing one substance from getting into relation with another substance. Where there is a covering of a fewer number of atoms of light (*tejas*), one perceives a shadow.

In his commentary on Udayana's *Ātmatattvaviveka*, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi remarks that the inherent cause of a conjunction is the very substance in which it is produced, and not any part or section thereof. Hence, the possession of parts is not a necessary precondition for the production of a conjunction. As for instance, there is conjuction between the self and *manas*, both of which are partless entities. There can thus be conjunction even in partless atoms.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE REALITY OF A PARTLESS ENTITY.

(niravayava-prakaraṇa)

IV. On the refutation of the doctrine of the denial of external object

Bhāṣya

[Objection] And now you [the Naiyāyika] contend, on the evidence of the various cognitions acquired, that there exist [real] objects underlying the various cognitions. However, all these cognitions are merely false cognitions, for had they been indeed 'valid cognitions' (*tattvabuddhi*) one would have apprehended, while analysing by means of 'critical judgment' (*buddhi*), the essential nature (*yāthātmya*) of the objects underlying the various cognitions.

Sūtra 26

[Objection] There is however no apprehension of the essential nature of objects, when they are analysed by means of critical judgment ; the non-awareness of the essential nature of an object is similar to the non-awareness of the existence of a cloth when each of the yarns is taken into account separately. // iv. 2.26 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] For instance, when each of the yarns is taken into account separately, through the critical judgment in the form 'it is a yarn, it is a yarn, it is a yarn', one in fact does never apprehend any other object [as distinct from mere yarns, namely, the alleged 'cloth' of the Naiyāyika] which may be said to be the object underlying the cognition of a cloth. There being thus no awareness of the essential nature [of a cloth and thereby the non-existence of a cloth being established], the cognition of a cloth amounts to the cognition of an object which does not exist and as such, becomes a false cognition. Similar is the case everywhere [i.e. with all other alleged real objects].

Elucidation

According to Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra, the present section is a refutation of the Vijñānavādin standpoint. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa however points out that, from Vātsyāyana's way of interpretation, the opponent here seems to be the Ānupalambhikas (already referred to in the preceding section) rather than the Vijñānavādins.

The opponeat argues that if one analyses any one of the so-called real objects one finds that there is no such thing as the essential nature of an object—which means, in other words, that the object does not exist. Take, for instance, the case of what is

taken to be a cloth. When critically analysed, it reveals nothing but a few yarns—no one perceives a different substance apart from the yarn that may be termed a cloth. In the same way, a yarn, if properly analysed, reveals merely some particles of spun cotton, but not any distinct substance in the form of a yarn. Thus, through critical analysis, it is proved that there is neither any essential nature of an object nor an object itself and all the cognitions of objects—pointing to what are not actually there—become merely false cognitions.

Sūtra 27

[Answer] The ground [mentioned by the opponent above] does not prove its point because of contradiction. // iv. 2.27 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] If there be an analysis of objects by means of critical judgment, there cannot be a non-apprehension of the essential nature of all the various objects. If, on the other hand, there be a non-apprehension of the essential nature of all the various objects, there can be no analysis by means of critical judgment. 'An analysis of objects by means of critical judgment' and 'a non-apprehension of the essential nature of objects' are opposed to each other. Thus, it has been said [already in *Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 2.15] : Moreover, the said difficulty (*prasaṅga*) relating to the 'whole' and the parts would continue till an 'absolute non-existence of all things' (*pralaya*).

Elucidation

The opponent's ground for proving the non-existence of objects is the non-apprehension of the essential nature of objects, and the ground for such non-apprehension, is analysis by means of critical judgment. Refuting the opponent, Gautama says in the present *sūtra* that these two grounds are mutually opposed. As Vātsyāyana explains, if an object can be really analysed by means of critical judgment, its essential nature cannot remain unknown, because a critical analysis actually reveals the essential nature of an object. Indeed, if an object be really without any essential nature of its own, it can never be subjected to a critical analysis. Nor can there be a critical analysis, if there be a non-apprehension of its essential nature. In short, the opponent—since he admits the possibility of a critical analysis of an object—has got to admit ultimately even the reality of an object.

Lastly, by quoting *Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 2.15, Vātsyāyana indicates that the argument he has given thereunder is to be applied against the opponent here also. He has argued that, if there be no object of apprehension, there can neither be an apprehension itself,

and hence, a ground which would have to be established on the basis of such an apprehension cannot at all proceed, since it destroys its own very foundation.

Sūtra 28

[Answer] It [i.e. an object=an effect] is not apprehended in separation from [its material causes], because it has got those [material causes] for its substratum.
// iv. 2.28 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] A 'substance which is an effect' (*kārya-dravya*) has for its substratum 'substances which are its [material] causes' (*kāraṇa-dravya*). For this reason, it is not apprehended in separation from those causes. [An object, it is observed,] is apprehended in separation in the opposite circumstances. That is, an object is apprehended as separated only when there is no 'substratum-superstratum relation' (*āśrayāśrita-bhāva*). [A substance is never perceived as separated from the substratum it inheres in ; it can be perceived as separated only from objects to which it is not related through inherence.]

Even if analysed by means of critical judgment, objects are apprehended as distinct entities with reference to the imperceptible atoms [i.e. as distinct from the atoms, the ultimate constitutents]. An object which is perceived by the sense-organ is determined, on the basis of examination by means of critical judgment, to be something distinct [from the mere atoms].

Elucidation

As against the contention of the opponent that a cloth does not exist, because it is not perceived as something distinct from mere yarns, Gautama says here that a cloth is not perceived in separation from the yarns, not because it is non-existent, but because they are the very substratum a cloth inheres in. The implication is as follows. The yarns from which a cloth is produced are the material causes of a cloth and a cloth is an effect of the yarns. An effect always comes into being as located in the material causes, and hence, an effect is present in the material causes always through the relation of inherence. There is thus established a substratum-superstratum relation between the yarns and a cloth, and because of such a relation a cloth is never perceived in separation from the yarns. Thus, when the visual sense comes in contact with a cloth, it invariably comes in contact with also the substratum of a cloth. As a result, the yarns too are perceived along with a cloth, and a cloth is perceived as being located in those yarns only and nowhere else. On the contrary, there being no substratum-superstratum

relation between a cow and a horse, for instance, the two are always perceived in separation from each other.

Vātsyāyana lastly points out that though, on critical examination, a cloth is not observed to be apprehended apart from the yarns, a cloth is to be admitted as a distinct entity with reference to its ultimate constituents, namely, the atoms which are imperceptible. Thus, while perceiving a cloth, one also perceives the yarns, but not the atoms. It is therefore concluded that a cloth which is perceptible is something distinct from those ultimate imperceptible atoms which are only inferable. Atoms themselves may be imperceptible ; still, difference(*bheda*)-from-atoms as present in perceptible substances like a cloth etc. can be perceived, because the precondition for the perception of difference (*bheda*) is the perceptibility of the locus (*ādhāra*) of difference and not that of the counter-positive (*pratiyogin*).

Sūtra 29

[Answer] [The ground mentioned by the opponent in *sūtra* 26 is illogical], also because an object is rightly cognised through a *pramāṇa*. // iv. 2.29 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] [It is to be admitted that] the essential nature of objects—when they are examined by means of critical judgment—is actually ascertained. 'An object exists : it exists as possessing some specific properties ; an cbject does not exist ; it does not exist as possessing some specific properties'—all these are rightly determined on the basis of a cognition acquired through a *pramāṇa.* And an examination of objects by means of critical judgment means nothing but [determining their essential nature on the basis of] a cognition acquired through a *pramāṇa.* All the different branches of learning, all purposive actions and all the activities of the living beings are based on it [i.e. such determination of objects]. An expert ascertains by means of critical judgment [the nature of an object] : 'it exists' or 'it does not exist'. If it be so [i.e. if a cognition acquired through a *pramāṇa* is admitted to be the only means for ascertaining the true nature of objects], it is illogical to claim that all objects are non-existent.

Elucidation

An examination by means of critical judgment is really nothing but determining the true nature of an object on the basis of cognitions acquired through a *pramāṇa.* Since, however, a *pramāṇa* invariably indicates the true nature of an object and it is

proved thereby that an object as characterised by its essential nature exists, it would be illogical to argue that there being no apprehension of the essential nature of an object on critical examination, an object does not really exist.

Sūtra 30

[Answer] [The opponent's thesis 'all is non-existent' is illogical], because [it can be justified by admitting] neither the presence nor the absence of independent *pramāṇa* establishing it. // iv. 2.30 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] If it be so [i.e. if it be accepted that a *pramāṇa* rightly indicates the essential nature of an object], the thesis that all is non-existent cannot be justified. Why ? Because [it can be justified by admitting] neither the presence nor the absence of an independent *pramāṇa* establishing it. If there be an independent *paramāṇa* establishing the thesis 'all is non-existent', the very thesis 'all is non-existent' would be contradicted, [for the opponent would have to admit the reality of that *pramāṇa* at least]. If, on the other hand, there be no independent *prąmāṇa*, how would the thesis 'all is non-existent' be established at all ? If, however, [you admit that the thesis] is established without the help of any independent *pramāṇa*, how is it that the thesis 'all is existent' is not established [in the same way] ?

Sūtra 31

[Objection] The notion of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* [is wrong], just like the false awareness of an object in the state of dream. // iv. 2.31 //

Sūtra 32

[Objection] Or, [the notion of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* is wrong], just like the false perceptions of [the non-existent as 'existent'] due to 'magician's trickery' (*māyā*), of 'castles in the sky' (*gandharva-nágara*) and of water in a mirage (*mṛgatṛṣṇikā*). // iv. 2.32 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] Just as, in the state of dream, there is no object really, yet one wrongly perceives them, so also there is really nothing called *pramāṇa* or *prameya*, yet one has wrong notions about them.

Elucidation

In the preceding *sūtra* Gautama has argued that a *pramāṇa* reveals the true nature of an object or a *prameya*. To this, the opponent now replies that, in reality, there is neither a *pramāṇa* nor a *prameya*. The ideas of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are simply false, because they relate to something imaginary and not real. To substantiate his contention, the opponent first refers to the wrong perceptions of objects in a dream (*sūtra* 31). Foreseeing a rejoinder that the perception of an object, in the waking state, which is the basis of practical activity is quite different from the perception of an object in the state of dream, the opponent also points (in *sūtra* 32) to some indisputable cases of wrong perceptions even in the waking state.

Sūtra 32 above has been commented upon by neither Vātsyāyana nor Uddyotakara. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa thinks that even then there can be no doubt about its genuineness on the following grounds. First, (senior) Vācaspati, the author of *Nyāya-sūcīnibandha*, (junior) Vācaspati, the author of the *Nyāya-sūtroddhāra* and Viśvanātha, the author of the *Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti* have all accepted it as a *sūtra* of Gautama. Secondly, Vātsyāyana too, later in *sūtra* 35, refutes the instances of *māyā*, *gandharva-nagara* etc. as instances offered by the opponent. Thirdly, Vātsyāyana here refrains from commenting upon the latter *sūtra* only because its implication is made quite clear from the explanation of the former.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa lastly points out that the instances of *māyā* and the like were not the inventions of the Vijñānavādins and the Śūnyavādins, for these are found even in the Upaniṣads (cf. *Maitrī-upaniṣat*, 4th *prapāṭhaka: Indrajālam iva māyāmayaṃ svapna iva mithyādarśanam* etc.)

Sūtra 33

[Answer] [The thesis of the opponent] is not established [by the said instances], because there is no proper ground (*hetu*) for it. // iv. 2.33 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] There is no ground to establish the thesis that the notion of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* is similar to wrong awareness of an object in the state of

dream, and not to the [right] cognition of an object in the waking state and hence, due to the lack of a proper ground, the thesis is not established. There is also no ground to establish that in the state of dream absolute non-entities only are apprehended.

[Objection] If it be argued that [objects experienced in a dream are unreal], because they are not apprehended in the waking state ?

[Answer] [The reality of objects] cannot be denied, because objects are [rightly apprehended in the waking state. To explain, if it be argued that objects apprehended in a dream are non-existent because they are not apprehended in the waking state, then [it also can very well be argued] that the objects which are [rightly] apprehended by one who is awake are all existent, because they are [rightly] apprehended [in the waking state].

The ground [viz. non-apprehension] is in fact capable of proving its point [viz. the non-existence of an object] only in the opposite case [i.e. only if the reality of an object is admitted]. [That is, the non-apprehension of an object at some particular place and time can establish its non-existence at that particular place and time, only if the object is admitted to be real, and not otherwise—if the object is admitted to be an absolute non-entity.] If the existence [of an object] is admitted on the ground that it is apprehended, then only the non-existence [of an object] can be proved on the ground that it is not apprehended. If the non-existence [of an object] be admitted in both cases [i.e. when it is apprehended as well as when it is not apprehended], non-apprehension would not be able to establish its point. As for instance, [consider] the case of the non-apprehension of colour [in the dark] due to the absence of a lamp. There non-existence [i.e. absence of colour-perception due to the absence of a lamp] is established on the basis of existence [i.e. presence of colour-perception due to the presence of a lamp].

Moreover, [the opponent has got to] state the causes for the variety in dream-experiences. The opponent who contends that [the notion of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*] is wrong, just like the false awareness of an object in the state of dream has got to speak of causes for the variety in dream-experiences. Some of the dreams are accompanied by fear, some of the dreams are accompanied by pleasure and some of the dreams are opposed to both [i.e. neither fearful nor pleasant]; and some times one does not at all have any dream. If it is admitted that the false awareness of an object in a dream is due to some distinct cause, then only the variety in dream-experiences can be explained to be due to the variety of the causes.

Elucidation

As against the opponent's contention that the notions of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are as false as the awareness of objects in a dream, Gautama remarks that there is no ground to establish it. Vātsyāyana brings out the implication of Gautama's remark as

follows: That the cognitions acquired in the state of dream are all false cannot be proved unless there be later some other cognitions contradicting the prior dream-experiences. In fact, the very cognitions acquired by one in the waking state are to be considered as the ones contradicting the dream-experiences. In that case, the cognitions acquired in the waking state are to be accepted as valid also, for nothing other than a valid cognition can contradict a false cognition. It may thus be argued, with the instance of the cognitions acquired in the waking state which are valid, that the notions of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are quite alright and not false.

Though there may be divergenee of opinion regarding the actual nature of a dream-experience, there is unanimity on the point that dream-experiences are invariably false, because they pertain to objects which are not actually present to the perceiver at the moment he is under the impression of experiencing them. Vātsyāyana argues that the opponent cannot prove the falsity of dream-experiences, since he cannot offer any ground to establish that the objects experienced in a dream are absolute non-entities. The argument that the unreality of the dream-objects is proved by their subsequent non-apprehension in the waking state would be of no avail, for in that case, one would have to admit the reality of the objects when they are experienced in the waking state. One can prove the non-existence of an object on account of its non-apprehension only if one accepts the existence of an object on account of its apprehension. For instance, the non-perception of colour in the dark in the absence of a lamp is proved to be a fact on the ground that there is perception of colour in the presence of a lamp.

Lastly, Vātsyāyana contends that the opponent cannot also offer any explanation for the variety in dream-experiences. It is a fact that some dreams are fearful, some delightful, and some different from both. The opponent however advocates that nothing in this world is real and as such, he cannot point to anything that may be said to be responsible for such varied nature of dream-experiences.

Sūtra 34

The awareness of an object in a dream is similar to [the awareness of an object] in the cases of memory-knowledge (*smṛti*) and 'longing' [for the obtainment of an object enjoyed previously]' (*saṃkalpa*).

// iv. 2.34 //

Bhāṣya

That is, [as in the case of memory-knowledge or longing, a dream-experience also] pertains to a [real] object perceived previously. Just as memory-knowledge and longing pertain to objects perceived previously and are incapable of disproving

the reality of their objects, so also the awareness of an object in a dream pertains to a [real] object perceived previously and is not capable of disproving the reality of an object. And thus, dream-experiences relate to objects which are perceived [to be real] in the waking state. The same person who experiences dreams, while asleep, also recollects, while awakened, the dream-experiences, in the form 'I dreamt of this object'. The awareness of the object in the state of dream is however ascertained as 'false' because of the appearance of a [subsequent] cognition in the waking state [indicating that the object of the dream-experience had not been really present there]. That is, after such recollection [viz. the recollection of the object of dream-experience by one, in the form 'I saw this object in a dream'], one who is awakened acquires a further definite cognition [indicating that the object of the dream-experience had not been really there] ; because of this [further cognition] there follows an ascertainment, namely, the awareness of the object in the state of dream is false.

If there be no difference between the two [i.e. the states of dream and waking], the argument becomes useless. That is, for the opponent who does not admit any difference between the states of dream and waking, the argument—viz. [the notion of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* is wrong], just like the false awareness of an object in the state of dream—has no use, because the opponent rejects the very foundation of a dream-experience. [The falsity of the experiences in a dream is established on the basis of the validity of the experiences in the waking state. According to the opponent however all cognitions are equally false and hence, he is be in a position to offer an argument with the instance of a dream-experience].

Moreover, an erroneous cognition, which is a cognition of 'that' (say, a snake) in what is not 'that' (say, a rope), has for its basis a 'principal cognition' (*pradhāna*) [i.e. the right cognition of 'that' in what is actually 'that']. One has for instance the erroneous cognition [of man]—this is a man—in a tree-trunk (*sthāṇu*) which is not a man and such a cognition has for its basis [i.e. cannot proceed without] a principal cognition [i.e. the right cognition of a man in what is a man]. In fact, [if it be supposed that] a man is never actually perceived [and thereby becomes an absolute non-entity], there can never be produced [an erroneous cognition] of man—this is a man—in what is not a man. In the same way, the awareness of an object in a dream also—such as, 'I saw an elephant' or 'I saw a mountain'—must have for its basis a principal cognition [i.e. the right cognition of an actual elephant or an actual mountain].

Elucidation

Vātsyāyana explains that, just like memory-knowledge (*smṛti*) and longing (*saṃkalpa*), a dream-experience also refers to an object perceived previously and not to something absolutely non-existent. The reality of such an object is proved by the fact that, before being revealed in a dream-experience, it had been the object of a valid

cognition in the waking state. It is observed that a person who experiences a dream while sleeping recollects his dream-experiences when awakened : 'I dreamt of this object'. The content (*viṣaya*) of this recollection is constituted by not only the knower, and the dream-experience itself but also the object one has dreamt of. The recollection of an object is not possible without an impression (*saṃskāra*) regarding it, and an impression, in its turn, is not possible without a prior cognition of it. On the evidence of the above recollection, it follows therefore that there must have been produced an impression regarding the object dreamt of also and this implies that the same object must have been cognised earlier in the waking state.

It may be objected that the falsity of a dream-experience—a point unanimously accepted—would be well-established on the assumption that the object experienced in a dream is unreal. If a dream-experience too is admitted to reveal a real object, how would one prove its falsity ? Vātsyāyana's answer to this is that the falsity of a dream-experience is not based upon the unreality of the object dreamt of. After the recollection of the dream-experience, one ascertains further : 'The object I dreamt of is not present here. My knowledge in the state of dream concerned something which was non-existing. Therefore, now in the waking state, I no longer apprehend that object.' Such an ascertainment leads one to the conclusion that the prior dream-experience is nothing but false.

Even then, the opponent may argue that a dream-experience may refer to an object previously perceived ; yet the reality of an object is not proved, for, according to him, all cognitions—in the states of dream as well as waking—are false and the so-called external objects are all absolutely non-existent. There being no right cognition of object, an impression regarding an object would be produced only from its false cognition which is acquired in the waking state, and a dream-experience regarding it or a recollection of the dream-experience would proceed from such an impression. It is therefore unnecessary to admit the reality of an object.

Refuting the above, Vātsyāyana points out that if the opponent denies any distinction between a dream-experience and an experience in the waking state, and considers both of them equally false, he cannot argue for his thesis, with the instance of a dream-experience, that the cognition of an object is as false as the awareness of an object in a dream. The implication is that a false cognition of an object is never possible unless there be a right cognition of the same. Thus, in the view of the opponent who totally denies the possibility of right cognition, a dream-experience—a specific kind of false cognition—becomes an impossibility and hence, it cannot be offered by him as a corroborative instance.

To illustrate how a right cognition is presupposed by a false cognition, Vātsyāyana referes to the false perception of a man in a tree-trunk. Such a false cognition cannot proceed without a right cognition of a man in what is man, because one who never before perceived a man actually cannot wrongly characterise a post as a human being. When one's visual sense comes in contact with a post, one perceives in it characteristics similar to those of a man, thereby recollects a man, and finally asceratins wrongly : this

is a man. Thus, there can be no false cognition of a man without the recollection of a man, no recollection without the impression regarding a man, and no impression without the prior right cognition of a man.

In short, objects experienced in a dream must be objects that had been previously perceived and hence, they are not unreal.

An objection may be raised here. There is no denying the fact that one can even dream of objects which one had never apprehended previously. The scriptures too often give descriptions of dreams, auspicious or ominous, the objects of which had never been known beforehand. In fact, one may experience in a dream events which can never take place in real life and of which one can have no previous experience. One may, for instance, dream of performing impossible feats like cutting down one's own head or swallowing the sun. Viśvanātha notes these objections and answers that in such cases even the objects must have been known separately on some previous occasions. One may not have the prior experience of cutting down one's own head ; still, one who dreams of such a fantastic feat must have known beforehand separately one's own head and the act of cutting. A dream-experience is nothing but a form of illusory perception and, in the above instance, the error lies in wrongly relating the act of cutting (actually perceived in relation to something else, say, a piece of wood) to one's own head.

The present *sūtra* clearly indicates that, according to Gautama, a dream-experience is to be distinguished from memory-knowledge ; it is a form of extraordinary perception invariably produced from impression (*saṃskāra*). Praśastapāda, though agreeing that a dream-experience is a form of extraordinary perception, differs from Gautama in maintaining that all dream-experiences are not preceded by impressions. Dreams having objects not to be experienced in real life are produced from specific forms of *adṛṣṭa*. Kumārila admits that a dream invariably concerns an object previously apprehended, but in agreement with Śaṃkara (cf. under *Brahmasūtra* ii. 2.29) considers it to be identical with memory-knowledge. As against the identification of dreams with memory-knowledge, the Naiyāyikas contend that, in the waking state, the after-knowledge of a dream experienced by one assumes the form 'I *saw* this object', but not 'I *recollected* this object', and this indicates that a dream-experience is only a kind of perception.

Bhāṣya

If it be so [i.e. if it be accepted that an erroneous cognition has for its basis a principal cognition in the form of right cognition], then only—

Sūtra 35

False knowledge can be removed by right knowledge, just like the removal of the false awareness of an object in a dream when one is awakened from sleep. // iv. 2.35 //

Bhāṣya

An ascertainment of the form 'this is a man' in respect of a post is false knowledge, [for] it is the knowledge of 'that' [=man] in what is 'not-that' [=post]. An ascertainment of the form 'this is a post' in respect of a post is right knowledge. And right knowledge only removes false knowledge, but does not [negate the reality of] the objects known, such as posts or human beings in general ; just as, the awareness produced in the waking state negates only the false awareness of an object in a dream, but not [the reality of] the things dreamt of, that is, objects in general. Similarly, the cognitions produced in the cases of a magician's trickery, castles in the sky and a mirage are only ascertainments of 'that' in what is 'not-that' [i.e. are only false perceptions]. In these cases also false knowledge only is removed, in the same manner as indicated above, by right knowledge, but [the reality of] the object [of false knowledge] is not negated.

Moreover, the false cognitions in the cases of a magician's trickery and the like are due to specific causes. The person who has got the means [for effecting a trickery] takes up an object similar to the particular object he intends to show [artfully to the spectator] and leads others into false perceptions ; this is what is known as trickery. When, in the sky, the cloud etc. assume the form similar to a castle, one has the [false] cognition of a castle [in the sky] from a distance. Otherwise [i.e. when the cloud etc. do not assume the form of a castle] there is no such cognition. When the rays of the sun intermingled with the heat radiating from the surface of the earth begin to flicker, one has [from a distance] the [false] perception of water [in them], for one perceives in them characteristics similar [to those of water]. Otherwise [i.e. if the similarity of water in the rays of the sun is not perceived], as in the case of one who is nearer, there is no such cognition. A false cognition is produced in respect of a particular person at a particular place at a particular moment, [and not in respect of every person, everywhere and always]. Hence it cannot be produced without a specific cause.

Moreover, it is observed that [in the case of an illusion created by the magician] there is difference in the cognitions of the person who effects the trickery and the person [who is subjected to the trickery] ; in the cases of [the illusory perceptions of] castles in the sky and [water in] a mirage [there is difference in the cognitions of] a person who stands at a distance and a person who stands nearer and as regards the object of a dream-experience, [there is difference in the cognitions of] one who is asleep and one who is awakened. This difference [in the cognitions of different persons] cannot be logically explained, if it is maintained that all objects are non-existent, absolute non-entities, or without any essence of their own.

Elucidation

The opponent may argue that even the subsequent right knowledge admitted to be the opposite or the annihilator of the prior false knowledge proves the unreality of the object of illusion, for as soon as right knowledge is produced, it is ascertained that the object of the prior false knowledge had not been actually present ; if it were actually present no illusion would have ever occurred. Therefore, it must be non-existent. In the present *sūtra*, Gautama gives his answer to such a possible contention. His implication, according to Vātsyāyana, is that right knowledge only annuls false knowledge, but it does not negate the reality of the object of illusion as well. When one who earlier took a post for a man rightly cognises it as a post later, one's false notion regarding the post only is removed, but the reality of the post or a man is in no way questioned. Vātsyāyana adds further that the instances cited by the opponent in *sūtra* 32 also are refuted by the present *sūtra*. Just like the false awareness of an object in a dream, the illusions in the cases of a magician's trickery, appearance of castles in the sky and a mirage also are removed by right knowledge produced subsequently. The reality of the underlying objects however is not disproved thereby. An illusion occurs only because the object wrongly perceived is not present *there* and not because it is not present *anywhere*. If it were an absolute non-entity no cognition whatsoever—valid or false—would have ever been possible in respect of it.

Rejecting the claim of the opponent that the notions of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are as false as the illusory perceptions in the cases of a magician's trickery or the appearance of castles in the sky, Vātsyāyana says that all such illusory perceptions are due to some specific causes and not accidental, for they are observed to be produced only in respect of a particular person, at a particular moment and at a particular place, but not in respect of everyone, always and everywhere. Similarly, the allegedly false notions of *pramāṇa* and *prameya* too must have some specific causes of their own. But, then, there is no ground to justify the assumption that the notions of *pramāṇa* and *prameya*—the basis for universal practical activity—are invariably accompanied by those specific causes falsifying knowledge. Thus it is not proved that such notions are universally false.

Moreover, the said instances of illusory perceptions cited by the opponent do not prove the unreality of all objects and the consequent illusoriness of knowledge in general. It is a fact that the notions of the magician and the layman are completely different from each other. The magician who is conscious of the trick knows that the object he artfully presents before the spectator is not really present there, while the spectator who is ignorant of the trick knows that the object presented before him by the magician is really present there. In the same way, a person standing at a distance perceives castles in the sky or water in a mirage, but the perceptions of a person standing nearer are quite opposite, and again, a person who perceives some objects to be real in the state of dream perceives them to be unreal in the waking state. Such difference in the cognitions

cannot be explained on the assumption that all objects are unreal or without any essence of their own, for, in that case, either there would be no cognition of objects (they being absolute non-entities) or the cognitions of all persons must be the same due to the fact that an absolute non-entity is an absolute non-entity for one and all, and not for the selected few.

The view refuted by Vātsyāyana here contends that all objects are without any essence of their own. It is clear therefore that this is not a refutation of the Vijñānavādins (as has been claimed by Uddyotakara and Vācaspati). According to the Vijñānavādins, the so-called objects are merely forms of consciousness (*vijñāna*) which alone is real and consciousness constitutes the essence of all objects. Therefore, they are not in a position to consider objects without any essence of their own.

Sūtra 36

Similar is the case with illusory knowledge [i.e. just like the object of illusion, the illusory knowledge too is a reality], because the existence of specific causes [producing illusory knowledge] as well as the appearance [of illusory knowledge] are facts established by experience. // iv. 2.36 //

Bhāṣya

[The reality of] illusory knowledge, just like that of its object, is not disproved. Why ? Because one finds that there are specific causes [for illusory knowledge] and also because one becomes aware of the appearance of illusory knowledge. One actually finds that there are specific causes giving rise to illusory knowledge and illusory cognitions—as they appear in the various individual selves—are perceived [internally], for they also are 'capable of being known' (*samvedya*). Therefore, illusory knowledge too exists really.

Elucidation

The facthood of illusory knowledge connot be denied because of two considerations. First, specific causes for the production of illusory knowledge are actually found and secondly, as soon as illusory knowledge is produced one becomes conscious of its presence through internal perception. It may not always be perceived specifically as illusory ; yet its perception as such (*svarūpataḥ*) cannot be denied. Explaining further, Uddyotakara says that the causes for illusory knowledge are the apprehension of common characteristic, the non-apprehension of specific characteristic and the

imputation of some characteristic which is absent from the object upon which it is imputed. If one admits the facthood of illusory knowledge, one has got to admit also specific causes for it. Again, if one admits the specific causes, one cannot but accept the reality of the objects of knowledge as well, because the specific causes too are actually apprehended and in their absence no illusory knowledge can be produced. Therefore, one who admits the facthood of illusory knowledge is bound to accept also the reality of its specific causes which are actually known, and one cannot stick to the contention that all objects are unreal.

Vācaspati Miśra explains the implication of Gautama in a different way. He says that, in the present *sūtra*, Gautama refutes the view of the Śūnyavādins who first establish the unreality of the external objects with the instance of 'illusory knowledge' and then, with the aid of the same instance, prove the unreality of knowledge as well, and argue that the real essenee of an object consists in its 'non-endurance on critical examination' (*vicārāsahatva*). Phaṇibhūṣaṇa comments that the doctrine of *śūnyavāda* as explained by Nāgārjuna and others does not speak of an 'absolute non-existence' (*atyanta-asattā*) of external objects and knowledge. According to the comments of Vātsyāyana under the present *sūtra*, Gautama here refutes the position of the Ānupalambhikas.

Sūtra 37

There is difference between the 'actual object' (*tattva*) and the 'object imputed' (*pradhāna*) [upon the real one] ; hence, the dual character of false knowledge is justified. // iv. 2.37 //

Bhāṣya

[In the illusory perception of a post as a human being], the actual object is represented by a post and the object imputed upon by a human being. Both the actual object and the object imputed upon exist really and there is difference between the two ; and that is why there may arise a false cognition characterising a post as a human being, when one apprehends the similarity between the two. Similar is the case with the illusory perceptions of a banner as a row of cranes and of a [similarly shaped] lump of earth as a pigeon. But then, all the illusory cognitions do not converge upon the same object, because there is regularity (*vyavasthā*) as regards thc perception of similarity. [That is, one takes a post for a human being, but not for a row of crane, or a pigeon, because one perceives in a post the similar characteristics of a human being only—and not of a row of crane or a pigeon]. One who thinks that all objects are without any essential

nature of their own and are absolute non-entities only would be led to the absurdity of a convergence [of all illusory cognitions] upon the same object.

[Even] when the objects of knowledge like 'smell' (*gandha*) etc. are cognised as 'smell' etc., the cognitions are considered to be false [by the opponent]. But in such cases no [distinction between] an 'actual object' and an 'object imputed upon' can be made and there is moreover no apprehension of similarity [between the two]. As such, they all become nothing but valid cognitions. Therefore, it is illogical to claim that the notions of *pramāṇa* and *prāmeya* are false.

Elucidation

The object of an illusory cognition is a twofold one : first, there is the object (*dharmin*, lit. property-possessor) upon which an imputation is being made, and then, there is the 'object' which is being imputed (*āropya*). In the present *sūtra*, the former is termed *tattva* and the latter *pradhāna*. For instance, in the wrong perception of a post as a human being, the post stands for *tattva* and the human being for *pradhāna*.

Both Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara are silent here on how the dual character of a false cognition is to be explained. According to Viśvanātha's interpretation, the implication of Gautama here is as follows. It cannot be argued that there is no valid cognition—that all cognitions are only false, because even the most well-known cases of false cognitions are observed to be valid in their *tattva*-aspect and false only in their *pradhāna*-aspect, and this is what is meant by the dual character of an illusory cognition. For instance, when a post is wrongly perceived as a human being in the form 'this is a man', the property of being a man may not be really present in it ; still, the post—the object presented before the visual sense—is to be admitted as characterised by this-ness (*idantva*), for when the wrong perception is later contradicted by the valid perception in the form 'this is a post', the contradiction lies only between 'post' and 'man' because of the incompatibility of the properties of 'being a post' (*sthāṇutva*) and 'being a man' (*puruṣatva*) ; but even then there is no inconsistency in characterising it as 'this' i.e. as qualified by this-ness. In other words, the perception becomes wrong only so far as the *pradhāna*-aspect is concerned and remains valid in its *tattva*-aspect (=*dharmin*-aspect). And all this is at the root of the popular saying concerning the Nyāya theory of error : *dharmiṇi sarvam abhrāntaṃ prakāre tu viparyayaḥ* (all cognitions are valid so far as the *dharmin* or the object on which an imputation is made is concerned ; the contradiction lies in connection with the qualifying property only).

It is to be noted that, strictly speaking, according to the Naiyāyikas even, not all false cognitions are partly valid and partly false, for there may be cases of cognitions which are wholly invalid. A false cognition—in which there is no apprehension of the property of this-ness (*idantva*) or any such other property as located in the qualificand (*viśeṣya*), but the whole qualificand is apprehended as qualified by a different property —is to be considered as wholly invalid. The Navya-naiyāyikas have given illustration

of such false cognitions. In fact, a false cognition is produced due to some 'vitiating condition' (*doṣa*), and because of the variety of the vitiating conditions the false cognitions too have a varied nature—some partly valid and partly invalid, and some wholly invalid.

There is however no denial of the fact that for each and every false cognition two entities—namely, the one representing *tattva* and the other representing *pradhāna*—are absolutely necessary. Hence, their reality can be denied by no means. The dual character of a false cognition (as explained above) is based upon the distinction of two such entities. If a false cognition is admitted to be produced invariably in respect of absolute non-entities, it would be always wholly false. In that case, one would have to admit, for instance, that when the false cognition regarding a post—viz. this is a man—is contradicted by a subsequent knowledge—viz. this is not a man—there is contradiction (*bādha*) in respect of the *this*-aspect also and one ascertains, at the time, the absence of the property of this-ness in the post. However, all this goes against actual experience and hence, the partial validity of such false cognitions as well as the reality of the two entities—*tattva* and *pradhāna*—must be admitted.

As a further argument against the Ānupalambhikas, Vātsyāyana says that false cognitions do not converge upon the same object. A post may be taken for a man, a white banner for a row of crane, and a lump of earth, black and similarly shaped, for a pigeon. But these false cognitions never converge. The false cognitions—'this is a man', 'this is a row of cranes' and 'this is a pigeon'—all pertain to some specific object only (respectively, a post, a white banner and a lump of earth) and, that is why a post is never taken for a row of cranes or a pigeon ; nor a white banner for a man or a pigeon ; nor a lump of earth for a man or a row of cranes. There is in fact a regularity as regards the perception of similarity. An object is taken for that particular object only the similarity of which is perceived in it. The similarity of a man is perceived in a post ; therefore, a post is taken for a man. Such a rule however is not possible, if all objects are taken to be absolute non-entities. Even if it be admitted that the perception of similarity is only illusory, in this view, all the objects would be perceived as similar to one another indiscriminately, for, as absolute non-entities, they are all equal and same. There would thus follow the absurdity of the convergence of false cognitions upon the same object.

Lastly, Vātsyāyana points out that the cognitions of the *prameya*-s as they actually are—for instance, the perception of *gandha* as *gandha*, etc.—claimed to be false only by the Anupalambhikas cannot be really considered to be so for various reasons. First, in such perceptions there can be no distinction of *tattva* and *pradhāna* which is a precondition for false knowledge. When *gandha* is perceived as *gandha*, *gandha* alone cannot represent both, for, by definition, *pradhāna* is what is imputed upon *tattva*. Secondly, in the opponent's view, *gandha* is a non-entity, and it cannot even represent what is *tattva*. As such, no awareness of *tattva* and *pradhāna* is possible. Thirdly, in such

cases there is no apprehension of similarity which is a further precondition for the production of false knowledge. *Gandha* is not perceived as *gandha* because of its similarity with *gandha*. Therefore, the perception of *gandha* as *gandha* and cognitions similar to it are to be accepted as nothing but valid.

It is to be noted that the 'apprehension of similarity' (*sāmānya-grahaṇa*) referred to by Vātsyāyana as a precondition for false knowledge stands for 'vitiating conditions' (*doṣa*) in general. Thus, there may be cases of false knowledge which are not due to apprehension of similarity, but other vitiating conditions, such as the perception of yellow colour in the conch-shell because of an attack of jaundice, the perception of smaller magnitude in the moon because of distance, etc.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa notes here some more objections against the opponent. First, the perception of *gandha* as *gandha*, for instance, cannot be false, because no vitiating condition is observed to be present there. The opponent may argue that all cognitions are false only, the vitiating condition in all cases being *saṃskāra* which is beginningless and of innumerable kinds. This however entails the admission of the reality of *saṃskāra* and its cause, because an absolute non-entity can never produce an effect. Whatever produces an effect exists really. Thus, it cannot be concluded that all objects are non-existent. Again, if one admits an object which exists really, one would have to concede further that its cognition too is valid. It cannot therefore be argued that knowledge is false only. Secondly, a cognition is ascertained to be false only if it is subsequently contradicted by a further cognition. The knowledge of *gandha* as *gandha* is however never contradicted by a subsequent knowledge in the form 'it is not *gandha*'. Thirdly, if there be nothing called valid knowledge, there can also be nothing to which the term 'invalid knowledge' may be applied.

In short, the contention of the opponent that all notions concerning *pramāṇa* and *prameya* are only false does not stand logically.

Uddyotakara thinks that the present section is a refutation of Vijñānavāda and explains *sūtra* 31 above accordingly. Thus, the opponent's position is that, just as the objects known in the state of dream are nothing different from consciousness (*citta*= *vijñāna*=*vijñapti*), so also the objects known in the waking state too are not entities different from consciousness. In other words, no other object except consciousness or knowledge exists really. Uddyotakara refutes it under *sūtra* 33 and also mentions an inference offered by the Vijñānavādins : the (so-called external) objects are not entities different from consciousness, because they are knowable (*jñeya*), just like 'pleasure and pain' (*vedanā*). Rejecting the inference, Uddyotakara says that pleasure or pain is an entity quite different from knowledge (*jñāna*), for pleasure or pain is an 'object to be cognised' (*grāhya*), while knowledge means its comprehension (*grahaṇa*). The object cognised and the act of comprehension can never be identical. Secondly, the admission of illusory knowledge necessarily entails the acceptance of its opposite, i.e. valid knowledge, also. An object which is never known rightly can also be never known

falsely. Thirdly, one who does not admit the reality of any object other than mere consciousness will not be in a position either to defend one's own position or to refute that of others, because one will not be able to communicate or explain anything to others with one's own mere consciousness, which is unintelligible to everyone else, just as the dream-experiences of a particular person are known to himself alone. To this, it may be replied that when a person defends his own thesis or refutes that of others he employs words and with the aid of 'consciousness as endowed with the form of a word' (*śabdākāra-citta*) communication or explanation becomes possible; consciousness as endowed with the form of a word is not unintelligible to others. The reply however does not fit in, for the Vijñānavādins do not admit the reality of *śabda* as an external object and hence, they cannot speak of consciousness as endowed with the form (*ākāra*) of *śabda*. Fourthly, on the claim that no external object apart from consciousness exists really, no distinction can be made between the states of dream and waking, for, in that case, objects will be equally non-existent always.

Uddyotakara further argues that if there be no distinction between the states of dream and waking, no rule can be made as to the production of virtue (*dharma*) or vice (*adharma*) from particular actions. For instance, when a person dreams of having intercourse with a woman with whom it is forbidden, no *adharma* is produced; but if he performs such an action in the waking state, *adharma* is produced. If objects be equally non-existent in both the states, how is it that one acquires *adharma* due to illicit intercourse in the waking state only? The Vijñānavādins may point out that the distinction between the states of waking and dream may be explained by the facts that in the former there is no impediment (*upaghāta*) in the form of sleep, but in the latter the impediment is there, and again, in the former the knowledge is distinct (*spaṣṭa*), while, in the latter the knowledge is indistinct (*aspaṣṭa*). However all these are of no avail. How can it be ascertained that the impediment of sleep is the cause of mental perversion, and how can the distinctness or the indistinctness of a knowledge be determined unless there be a real object underlying it? To this, the Vijñānavādins may reply that cognitions differ in spite of the absence of real objets underlying them. For instance, the *preta*-s all born as a result of the same evil actions perceive a river full of 'purulent matter' (*pūya*), where in fact there is neither a river nor purulent matter. In the same way, some other *preta*-s perceive a river full of water in the same place, and still others find it to be a river full of blood. It follows therefore that consciousness or *vijñāna* alone appears in such diversified forms, although there is no external object. As against the above, Uddyotakara asks, what exactly is meant by 'form' and how does consciousness assume that 'form'? If the reality of an external object is not admitted, one can never speak of the 'form' of an object or of consciousness as appearing with the 'form' of an object. Besides, if there be no real object, the fact that a particular object is perceived only at a particular place and not everywhere cannot be explained. If consciousness is admitted to acquire the form of an object in spite of the object's absolute non-existence or absence at a particular place,

then what is there to prevent the appearance of consciousness with the form of the object everywhere ? A rule can be made only if the reality of an external object is admitted : consciousness appears with the form of an object only where the object is present ; if the object is absent, consciousness too is not produced there.

In his *Nyāyavārtika*, Uddyotakara has strongly criticised the position of the Vijñānavādin Buddhists. His arguments were mentioned and criticised by the later Vijñānavādins like Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and others. Still later, following the Nyāya standpoint, Vācaspati Miśra again refuted in details the views of the Vijñānavādins in his different works (such as *Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā. Tattva-samīkṣā, Nyāyakaṇikā,* commentary on *Vyāsa-bhāṣya, Bhāmatī-ṭīkā*). For a proper and detailed study of the intricate arguments with which the Vijñānavādins sought to establish their position and the strong criticism made against it by the Brahmanical philosophers, it is necessary to read the original texts carefully. However, the view of Vijñānavādins and its refutation may briefly be noted here.

The main contention of the Vijñānavādins is that there is no difference between an act (*kriyā*) and the 'condition bringing it about' (*kāraka*). They argue that nothing else is required for the manifestation (*prakāśa*) of consciousness. That which is manifested (*prakāśya*), that which manifests (*prakāśaka*) and the act of manifestation (*prakāśa-kriyā*) itself are all same and identical. Therefore, there is no other entity which may be said to be manifested or known by consciousness. Nor is there a further cognition which may be said to cognise the knowledge or consciousness itself. There being thus no separate existence for what is manifested and what manfiests, consciousness alone is manifested—and manifested by its own self.

Another important argument of the Vijñānavādins (which has been criticised by Śaṃkara and Vācaspati, but not Uddyotakara) is contained in the following famous and oft-quoted verse : *sahopalambha-niyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ / bhedaś ca bhrānti-vijñānair dṛśyetendāv ivādvaye //.* The idea is as follows. In the case of the cognition of the blue, there is no distinction between the blue and its knowledge, the blue being merely knowledge itself as appearing in the form of the blue. Similarly, in the case of cognitions everywhere, what is said to be the object of knowledge is really nothing but a particular form of knowledge or consciousness itself. An object has no separate existence as distinct from knowledge itself. Without knowledge, the object of knowledge is a non-entity. The ground for this conclusion is given in the expression : *sahopalambha-niyamāt.* If the word *saha* is taken in the usual sense of companionship (*sāhitya*), the meaning will be : since the object of knowledge is invariably perceived together with the cognition itself, i.e. since the cognition of the object too is not produced, if there be no cognition of the cognition itself. The acceptance of this meaning however will lead to the assumption that there is a difference between the object of knowledge and the

cognition itself, because the sense of companionship or 'together with' is logically justifiable only if there are two distinct entities. The ground will thus become contradictory. In fact, Bhadanta Śubhagupta, a Vaibhāṣika Buddhist, brought this charge against the Vijñānavādins.

In his *Tattvasaṃgraha*, Śāntarakṣita has explained the above ground without employing the word *saha.* According to his interpretation, the argument of the Vijñānavādins is that the cognition of the cognition of the blue and the cognition of the blue are one and the same. The word *saha*, in the expression *sahopalambha*, thus means 'one' or 'identical' and *sahopalambha* implies the singleness or oneness of the cognition. Everywhere the very cognition of the cognition is the same as the cognition of the object. Apart from the cognition of the cognition there is no other cognition of the object. This proves that there is no distinction between the cognition and the object cognised. In spite of their identity, they are perceived to be different only because of illusion, as in the case of the perception of two moons in the same moon.

Some of the objections against the Vijñāṇavādians may be noted.

First, there is no proof for the identity of knowledge and its object. In actual experience, the cognition of the cognition and the cognition of the object are observed to be different—the object is revealed only as separate from the knowledge.

Secondly, the 'object of action' (*karma-kāraka*) and the action (*kriyā*) itself are always observed to be different, as for instance, the act of cutting down (*chedana-kriyā*) and the tree that is cut down (*chedya-padārtha*). Similarly, the object known is the 'object of action' (*karma-kāraka*) in relation to the 'act of knowing' (*jñāna-kriyā*). Therefore, the two must be different from each other.

Thirdly, the reality of knowledge cannot be explained without the reality of the object known, because no knowledge 'without an underlying object of its own' (*nirviṣayaka*) is ever produced. It may be objected that the objects are really forms of consciousness and as such, they exist—not as external objects—but as mere consciousness. The perceptions of the so-called external objects are thus only illusory perceptions in which the internal (*antaḥ*) consciousness is wrongly presented as 'similar to what is external' (*vahirvat*). This is however untenable, because the Vijñānavādins do not accept the reality of anything external and hence, they cannot speak of similarity with the external. Comparison is not possible, if the very 'basis of the comparison' (*upamāna*) is a non-entity. One can never make a statement to the effect "the boy resembles the 'son of a barren woman' (*bandhyāputra*)".

Fourthly, the diversity in the nature of objects cannot be explained unless they have a real existence. This diversity cannot bè said to be due to the diversity of the beginningless *saṃskāra* (as the Vijñānavādins claim), because without the diversity of the objects themselves, the *saṃskāra*-s in respect of them cannot acquire diversity.

Fifthly, the claim that there is no object distinct from mere knowledge entails the assumption that in all acts of knowing there is only a knowledge of knowledge. But then,

why does not one, as soon as a knowledge is produced, have an awareness in the form 'I have the knowledge of a knowledge'? It may be answered that external objects have an imaginary (*kalpita*) or practical (*vyavahārika*) existence, but no real (*pāramārthika*) existence; and, in the perception of such an object, the internal knowledge only is wrongly presented as the external. This however leads to a more serious difficulty, namely, that there can thus be no identity of knowledge with the object on the ground that an entity with real existence (i.e. real) can never be identical with an entity with imaginary existence (i.e. unreal).

Sixthly, if all cognitions of objects are considered false, there will be no valid cognition whatsoever. This implies that there can be no false cognition either, for the falsity of a cognition is determined only with reference to a contradiction with the subsequent valid cognition. The total absence of valid cognition, again, leads to the total absence of *pramāṇa*, for *pramāṇa* is defined to be the instrument of valid cognition only. No thesis can be established without the aid of *pramāṇa* and thus the Vijñānavādins will not be able to prove even their own points. It cannot be argued that they can do so with the help of inference or *anumāna* which is accepted as a *pramāṇa* by others, because any inference rejecting the reality of external objects will be 'contradicted by perception' (*pratyakṣa-bādhita*) due to the fact that external objects are perceived to be existing as distinct from their consciousness.

Seventhly, the properties of externality (*bāhyatva*) and grossness (*sthūlatva*) perceived in a jar, for instance, can never belong to knowledge or consciousness. Therefore, such properties cannot be explained to be 'forms of consciousness.'

Eighthly, there can be no false cognition unless there is similarity between the 'locus of illusion' (*bhrama-adhiṣṭhāna :* the object which is wrongly perceived as something else) and the 'object imputed upon it' (*āropya*). This is evident from the fact that the shell may be taken for silver, but never for a human being. According to the Vijñānavādins, in the illusion of the shell as silver, the locus of illusion is the shell which is imaginary and unreal, while the object imputed upon is the silver-form-possessing (*rajatākāra*) consciousness which is real. But no similarity being possible between the real and the unreal, such illusions cannot be logically explained by the Vijñānavādins.

Lastly, as Jayanta Bhaṭṭa has pointed out, according to Vijñānavādins, in all cases of illusion. the internally known consciousness—which is the self (*ātman*)—is imputed upon an imaginary external object. However, if it were really so, the perception of a jar or the wrong perception of the shell as silver would have been of the form 'I am a jar' or 'I am silver' and not of the form 'this is a jar' or 'this is silver', for an illusion is always the illusion of the internally known consciousness, in which the self—which is nothing other than such consciousness—must be manifested as 'I' (*aham*).

Thus the claim of the Vijñānavādins that consciousness alone is real is not tenable.

In this connection, it may be worthwhile to have some idea about the different theories of illusion current in the various schools of Indian philosophy. Generally, five such theories are enumerated : (i) *ātma-khyāti*, (ii) *asat-khyāti*, (iii) *akhyāti*, (iv) *anyathā-khyāti* and (v) *anirvacanīya-khyāti*. Though the word *khyāti* means only knowledge (cf. Uddyotakara on *Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 2.34, *Yogadarśana* i. 16 & ii. 26 etc.), it is used in the above expressions, in the sense of illusory knowledge.

The last one of these theories—*anirvacanīya-khyāti*—is subscribed to by the Advaita Vedāntins. According to them, in the illusion of the shell as silver, false (*mithyā*) silver is produced in the shell due to ignorance (*ajñāna*=*avidyā*). 'False' means indetrminable (*anirvacanīya*). In other words, the silver produced due to ignorance in the shell can be specifically characterised as neither real (*sat*) nor unreal (*asat*) ; hence, it is indeterminable. Similar is the case with other illusions. The main argument of the Advaita Vedāntin is that in the illusions of the shell as silver and the rope as snake there can be no wrong perception of silver and snake, if they are admitted to be absolutely non-existent there, for perceptual cognition is not possible without a sense-object contact. Thus to justify a contact between the visual sense and the silver or the snake it is to be accepted that false silver or false snake is produced there.

The Naiyāyikas explain illusions with the help of the extraordinary sense-object contact known as *jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*. Thus, according to them, the very (previous) knowledge of the silver, for instance, acts as the contact between the silver (existing elsewhere) and the visual sense, and there is no need to admit the production of false silver in the shell. Objecting to this, the Advaita Vedāntins point out that if one accepts an extraordinary sense-object contact like the *jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*, the inference of fire in the mountain, for instance, will not be possible. The inferential knowledge of fire is invariably preceded by the knowledge of fire (in some other locus than the *pakṣa*). This previous knowledge of fire will act as the extraordinary sense-object contact—a *jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa*—linking fire and the visual sense, and thus one will acquire the perceptual—but not the inferential—knowledge of fire, because the Naiyāyikas even admit that with reference to the same object the 'causal aggregate' (*sāmagrī*) for perception is more powerful than the causal aggregate for inference.

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of error is *anyathā-khyāti* (referred to as *viparīta-khyāti* by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa). According to the followers of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, in the shell-silver illusion, the shell and the silver are both real objects. The shell remains present there (before the eyes of the person having the illusion), while the silver remains present elsewhere. Thus in the shell one has the illusory perception of the silver which exists elsewhere. That is, there the shell instead of being manifested as the shell is manifested in a different way, namely, as the silver. This illusory perception of the

silver in the shell is a form of extraordinary (*alaukika*) perception. The extraordinary sense-object contact leading to such perception is the memory-knowledge of the previously apprehended silver produced from the apprehension of similarity etc. No ordinary (*laukika*) sense-object contact can be admitted in the case of illusions, because the object imputed upon is invariably absent there and the sense can have no normal connection with it.

As to the objection that the admission of *jñāna-lakṣaṇa-sannikarṣa* makes the inference of fire impossible, the Naiyāyikas answer that it is not claimed that each and every piece of knowledge acts as an extraordinary apprehensional connection leading to an extraordinary perception, for there is no logical justification for such a claim. When some particular knowledge is followed by an actual perceptual cognition, but there is no possibility of an ordinary apprehensional connection which may be said to be the cause of that perceptual cognition, then only the prior particular knowledge is accepted as an extraordinary apprehensional connection. In the inference of fire in the mountain, there is a previous knowledge of fire ; still, it is not an apprehensional connection, because it is not actually followed by a perception of fire. Thus no causal aggregate for percption being present inference can follow alright. Moreover, the Advaita Vedāntin's theory of the production of false silver in the shell is not justified, for the material cause of silver is absent there. Ignorance or *ajñāna* cannot be accepted as the material cause due to the fact that it is not a substance similar in nature to the perceptible silver.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa also subscribes to the theory of *anyathā-khyāti.*

According to the Prābhākaras, there is really no illusory knowledge, each and every knowledge being nothing but valid. Hence, their theory is known as *akhyāti-vāda.* (In the term *akhyāti, a-* implies absence, and *-khyāti* illusory knowledge.) The Prābhākaras contend that the so-called illusory cognition of the shell in the form 'this is silver' (*idaṃ rajatam*) is not really a single or undivided piece of cognition. There are two cognitions here : (i) the perceptual knowledge of the shell, referred to as *idam* and (ii) the memory-knowledge of silver, referred to as *rajatam.* As soon as the visual sense of the person concerned comes in contact with the shell lying before, he has the perceptual knowledge of the shell as 'this' (i.e. as merely on object). Then, apprehending its similarity with silver, the impression of silver previously perceived is revived and silver is recollected by him. Both these cognitions are valid and hence, there is nothing illusory in the said awareness. It may be objected that this theory goes against facts. It is observed that sometimes the person suffering from the illusion goes on further to pick up the shell, which implies that he specifically identifies the shell as silver. If there were actually two cognitions of dissimilar nature there, such identification and the consequent activity for the obtainment of the shell would not have been possible. To this, the Prābhākaras answer that the cause of activity in such cases is not a single or undivided cognition of silver, but the 'non-awareness of the difference' (*bhedāgraha*) between the shell lying before and the silver previously perceived. (For details, see *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, the fourth *prakaraṇa*).

Though differing from the Prābhākaras in various important respects, Rāmānuja (*Śrībhāṣya, jijñāsādhikaraṇa*) also argues that knowledge is valid only. The perception of the shell as silver is not an illusory cognition, because many component elements (*aṃśa*) of silver are present also in the shell which explains how the shell becomes similar to silver. When a person instead of perceiving the component elements of the shell in the shell perceives only the components elements of the silver therein; he is led to activity for the obtainment of silver and later speaks of the perception as illusory.

The Naiyāyikas have strongly and elaborately criticised the Prābhākara position. One of their arguments is that the perception of the shell as silver is to be taken as a single 'qualificative cognition' (*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*), for otherwise there can be no explanation for the activity for the obtainment of the shell. It is observed that everywhere a single qualificative cognition only produces the desire for the object and the desire in its turn leads to the activity for its obtainment, as for instance, when a person goes on to pick up real silver after specifically determining it as silver. Similar must be the case in the instance of the shell-silver illusion also. Indeed, the non-awareness of difference (which is merely an absence of knowledge) cannot be accepted as the cause for activity. Moreover, in the shell-silver illusion, when the person concerned ultimately comes to know that the object lying before him is not silver, but the shell only, he has an internal after-awareness of the preceding (illusory) perception in the form 'I took it to be silver', but not in the form 'I saw it first and then, recollected silver'. This shows that the wrong perception of the shell—that is silver—must have been a single qualificative cognition.

According to the Sarvaśūnyatāvādins (describe as Anupalambhikas by Vātsyāyana) who contend that all objects are unreal, everywhere only one unreal object is imputed upon another unreal object—both the locus of illsion and the object imputed upon being unreal. Hence, they are the advocates of *asat-khyāti-vāda.* They even admit the perceptual illusion of an absolute non-entity like a lotus blooming in the sky. According to Madhvācārya, in an illusion, the locus of illusion (e.g. the shell) is real, but the object imputed upon (e.g. the silver) is unreal. Thus he is also an advocate of *asat-khyāti-vāda,* though in a different sense—the unreal being imputed upon the real. In this connection, Phaṇibhūṣaṇa draws attention to the fact that the Mādhyamika Buddhists (the Śūnyavādins) cannot be said to be the advocates of *asat-khyāti-vāda,* for, according to the interpretation of Nāgārjuna and others, they do not accept the thesis that all objects are unreal. They contend, on the other hand, that an object is neither real nor unreal nor both real and unreal nor of a kind different from real and unreal (cf. *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha,* under Bauddhadarśana ; *Samādhirāja-sūtra* : *astīti nāstīti ubhe api mithyā* ; *Mādhyamika-kārikā* : *ātmano 'stitvanāstitve na kathañcic ca sidhyataḥ*). Thus, according to them, 'ultimate reality' (*pāramārthika-satya*) consists in not being subjected to these four alternatives. Objects known to be real in everyday life have only imaginary reality.

The Vijñānavādin Buddhists are known to be the advocates of *ātma-khyāti.* Their contention is that the existence of an object cannot be determined without the aid of knowledge, because no object is ever manifested unless it is presented through knowledge. Thus it follows that, in fact, knowledge only is the 'object to be known' (*jñeya*). When one perceives an object, only knowledge or consciousness which is apprehended internally, is manifested in an external form and, in reality, there is no external object. It is only an illusion—an imputation of the internally apprehended consciousness upon an imaginary external object. This internaly apprehended consciousness is nothing but the self (*ātman*) and as such, an illusion means the wrong imputation of the self upon an imaginary external object. In this view, there is no valid knowledge and hence, there is really neither a *pramāṇa* nor a *prameya*, the notions of these two being merely the figments of imagination. The reality of consciousness or knowledge however cannot be denied, because it is self-manifested (*sva taḥ-prakāśa*). Because of the countless variety of the *saṃskāras* appearing in a beginningless stream, innumerable varieties of knowledge are being produced. Besides, each and every knowledge is momentary (*kṣaṇika*). The stream of consciousness which goes on in the form 'I am, I am' (*ahaṃ aham*) or 'mine, mine' (*mama mama*) is called *ālaya-vijñāna* which is the self (*ātman*). Any knowledge other than such a stream is called *pravṛtti-vijñāna,* e.g. the jar-form-possessing-consciousness, the blue-form-possessing-consciousness and the like.

The Sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣiaka Budddists—collecttively known as Sarvāstivādins—may also be taken as the advocates of *ātma-khyati,* for, according to them, in an illusion, the object imputed upon (e.g. the silver on the shell) is only a form of consciousness. However, they differ from the Vijñānavādins on the point that they consider external objects to be real and distinct from mere consciousness.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE REFUTATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE DENIAL OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS.

(*bāhyārtha-bhaṅga-nirākaraṇa-prakaraṇa*)

V. On the means for enhancement of right knowledge

Bhāṣya

It has been said [under *Nyāya-sūtra* iv. 2.1] that the cessation of the false idea concerning the self results from the right knowledge about the causes of evil. But then, how is right knowledge produced ? [To this, the answer is]—

Sūtra 38

[Right knowledge is produced] due to the repeated performance of a specific form of *samādhi* (intense contemplation). // iv. 2.38 //

Bhāṣya

The specific form of *samādhi* is the conjunction of the mind with the self accompanied by a desire for acquiring right knowledge—the mind being withdrawn from the senses and held fast by a 'special kind of effort which compels the mind to stick to some particular object only' (*dhāraka-prayatna*). When such a state is attained, no cognition in respect of the objects of the senses is produced. From the repeated performance of such *samādhi*, there follows the [direct] 'apprehension of truth' (*tattvabuddhi*).

Elucidation

By listening to (*śravaṇa*) the scriptures and then, critically deliberating upon (*manana*), with the help of the arguments given by Gautama, what one learns from the scriptures, one may acquire right knowledge. But it will be only an indirect (*parokṣa*) apprehension of truth which does not lead to firm conviction. Even after such an apprehension, false cognitions may continue to be produced as before. It is thus necessary to have a direct apprehension of truth to dispel finally the false idea concerning the self. In the present section, Gautama discusses how it can be achieved.

Phaṇibhūṣaṇa comments that though the practice of *samādhi* and such other allied topics form the 'special subject-matter' (*prasthāna*) of Yogaśāstra and not of Nyāya, the nature of discussion here indicates that Gautama also accepts the practice of *samādhi* as the ultimate means for the direct apprehension of truth.

In some printed edition of the *Tātparya-ṭīkā*, the *sūtra* is read as : *samādhi-tattvābhyāsāt*. Phaṇibhūṣaṇa however accepts the reading of the *Nyāya-sūci-nibandha* : *samādhi-viśeṣābhyāsāt*.

Bhāṣya

It has been stated [under the preceding *sūtra*] that when such a state is attained no cognition in respect of the objects of the senses is produced. But this is—

Sūtra 39

[Objection] Not justified, because of the force (*prābalya*) of some objects of the senses.
// iv. 2.39 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] The above statement [viz. 'when such a state' etc.] does not stand logically, because one acquires a cognition even if one is not willing to have it. Why? Because of the force of some objects of the senses. It is observed that [sometimes] a cognition is produced even if one is not desirous of acquiring knowledge, as in the case of [one's auditory perception of] the roar of the cloud and the like. Thus the said specific form of *samādhi* is not logically possible.

Sūtra 40

[Objection] [The said specific form of *samādhi* is not logically possible], also because cognitions are produced due to hunger and the like. // iv. 2.40 //

Bhāṣya

[Objection] One, though unwilling, acquires cognitions due to hunger and thirst, [contacts with] the cold and the warm, and diseases. Therefore, concentration of the mind is not logically possible. [Concentration of the mind is a precondition for *samādhi*. Its impossibility means also the impossibility of *samādhi* itself.]

[Answer] It is true that [due to certain causes] one may [sometimes] remain in the 'ordinary condition' (*byutthāna*) without attaining the state of *samādhi*. There may indeed be circumstances which compel one to remain confined to the ordinary condition and they may obstruct the attainment of *samādhi*. Even then—

Sūtra 41

[Answer] [The said specific form of *samādhi*] can be attained due to the 'continued efficacy of the result' (*phalānubandha*) arising from 'actions in the previous births' (*pūrvakṛta*). [That is, *samādhi* is attained due to the accumulated *dharma* produced by the good deeds of the previous births.
// iv. 2.41 //

Bhāṣya

[Answer] The word *pūrvakṛta* [in the *sūtra*] means *dharma* which is of the most excellent [and efficacious] kind, is the cause for the attainment of right knowledge, and has been accumulated during the preceding births. The word *phalānubandha* [in the *sūtra*] means the capacity for the repeated performance of *yoga*. If repeated performance were useless no one would have put any reliance upon repeated performance [of an act]. Indeed, the effectiveness of repeated performance is observed even in the case of various ordinary actions [in daily life].

Besides, for the purpose of removing the obstructions [against *samādhi*]—

Sūtra 42

The repeated performance of *yoga* in places like the forest, the caves, the bank of a river and others has been prescribed. // iv. 2.42 //

Bhāṣya

Dharma produced by the repeated performance of *yoga* follows on even in the next births. After *dharma* [which is produced by the practice of *yoga*] and is the cause for the attainment of right knowledge has reached the highest limit where no further increase is possible, and the contemplation for the attainment of *samādhi* has become the most intense, there is producd right knowledge.

It is actually observed that [sometimes] the force of a particular object of the sense is subdued by concentration of the mind, for even an ordinary person [sometimes] remarks : 'I did not hear it, I did not know it, my mind was elsewhere'.

Elucidation

It has been contended that *samādhi* is not possible, because, due to the force of a particular object of the sense, one has got to acquire cognitions, even though one is

unwilling. To this, Vātsyāyana answers, under the present *sūtra*, that it is possible to achieve an absolute concentration of the mind, for the subdueing of the force of an object of the sense by concentration of the mind is observed to be a fact even in the case of an ordinary person.

Neither the *Nyāyavārtika* nor the *Tātparyaṭīkā* makes any reference to the present *sūtra*. From the words of Viśvanātha it appears that some took it to be a statement of Vātsyāyana. However, it has been accepted as a genuine *sūtra* in the *Nyāya-sūtra-vṛtti*, the *Nyāya-sūcī-nibandha* and the *Nyāya-sūtroddhāra*.

Bhāṣya

If it is admitted that there is a cognition for one, though one is unwilling, because of the force of an object of the sense, then—

Sūtra 43

Such a possibility arises even in the state of liberation. // iv. 2.43 //

Bhāṣya

[That is], even a person who has become liberated should acquire cognitions because of the capacity (*sāmarthya*) of the external object [to produce a cognition irrespective of the will of the knower].

Sūtra 44

No [i.e. there is no possibility of the production of knowledge or cognitions after the attainment of liberation], because [knowledge is] invariably produced only if there is [a body] produced [by *adṛṣṭa*]. // iv. 2.44 //

Bhāṣya

The conditions [necessary for the production of knowledge] are there only if there is a body produced as a result of *adṛṣṭa*, which is the substratum of actions (*ceṣṭā*), senses (*indriya*), and pleasure and pain Thus cognitions are invariably produced [only in the presence of such a body]. An external object in spite of having the force cannot [by itself] produce knowledge in the self. It is observed that [an external object] is capable of producing knowledge only when it has conjunction with a sense. [In short, the body is a precondition for the production of knowledge.]

Sūtra 45

But in the state of liberation there is no such [body]. [As such, no knowledge can be produced when liberation is attained.]
// iv. 2.45 //

Bhāṣya

In the state of liberation, because of the absence of *dharma* and *adharma*, there is also the absence of the conditions conducive to the production of knowledge, namely, the body and the senses. [Hence no knowledge is produced in the state of liberation.] Thus the statement [in *sūtra* 43 above] that such a possibility arises even in the state of liberation becomes illogical. Accordingly, [it is to be concluded that] liberation is the complete cessation of all sufferings. Since, in the state of liberation, the seed (*bīja*) of all sufferings [viz, *dharma* and *adharma*] as well as the substratum for all sufferings [viz. the body] are destroyed, [it follows] therefrom that liberation means the release from all sufferings. Suffering can never be produced without a seed and without a substratum.

Sūtra 46

For the attainment of liberation, one has to purify the self with the help of *yama* and *niyama* as well as regulations (*vidhi*) concerned with the self and the [other prescribed] means (*upāya*) [which are to be learned from] Yogaśāstra. // iv. 2.46 //

Bhāṣya

For the attainment of liberation [one has] to purify the self with the help of *yama* and *niyama*. *Yama* is the practising of the duties common to all pesons belonging to the four *āśrama*-s. *Niyama* [is the practising of the duties] prescribed specifically for each one [of the *āśrama*-s]. 'Purification of the self' (*ātma-saṃskāra*), again, is relinquishing *adharma* and accumulating *dharma*. Regulations concerned with the self are to be learnt from Yogaśāstra, and they are austerity (*tapaḥ*), control of breath (*prāṇāyāma*), withdrawing senses from external objects (*pratyāhāra*) concentration of the mind (*dhāraṇa*) and meditation (*dhyāna*). 'Repeated reflection upon the true nature' (*prasaṃkhyāna-abhyāsa*) of the objects of the senses is for the purpose of removing attachment and aversion. Means (*upāya*) is the practising of the rites prescribed in Yogaśāstra [for a *yogin* aspiring to liberation].

Sūtra 47

[For the attainment of liberation], one should take up (*grahaṇa*) and repeatedly reflect upon (*abhyāsa*) the Śāstra [*jñāna*, lit. the means by which right knowledge is acquired], and moreover, should hold discussions with persons who have a thorough knowledge of the Śāstra. // iv. 2.47 //

Bhāṣya

The expression 'for the attainment of liberation' is relevant here [i.e. it is to be added here from the previous *sūtra*]. The word *jñāna* [in the *sūtra*] means that by which one rightly knows—i.e. the Śāstra [propounded by Gautama] which is a study of the nature of the self. 'Taking up' this Śāstra means studying and understanding the implications of the Śāstra. 'Repeated reflection' means constant engagement [with the Śāstra], i,e. [constantly] studying, listening to and thinking over [the implications of the Śāstra]. Holding discussions with persons who have a through knowledge of the Śāstra is recommended for the purpose of bringing maturity (*paripāka*) to the knowledge [acquired from the Śāstra]. Maturity [of knowledge] means dispelling doubts, understanding the intricate implications previously unknown and firmly re-ascertaining what is already ascertained. 'Discussions with the learned' (*samvāda*) means holding discussions after going to the learned.

[In the following *sūtra*, Gautama himself is] explaining the unexplained statement of the previous *sūtra*, viz. 'one should hold discussions with persons who have a thorough knowledge of the Śāstra'—

Sūtra 48

One should go on to hold discussions with the disciple, the preceptor, the fellow-student and such other particular persons as are desirous of acquiring the final good [i.e. liberation]—who are all without malice [i.e. hold critical discussions not for victory, but for the ascertainment of truth only].
// iv. 2.48 //

Bhāṣya

The meaning of the *sūtra* becomes quite elear from the very reading of the *sūtra*. [Hence, no further explanation is necessary.]

If it be feared that the adherence [of one] to the thesis (*pakṣa*) and the adherence [of the other] to the anti-thesis (*pratipakṣa*) will go against each other [and generate attachment or aversion, and hence, discussion is not to be recommended for an aspirant after liberation], [the answer is as follows]—

Sūtra 49

Or, when [one has] the craving for [acquring the knowledge of truth], one—with a view to fulfilling one's purpose [viz. the attainment of right knowledge]—should go on to hold discussion, without trying to put forward one's own viewpoint. // iv. 2.49 //

Bhāṣya

The expression 'one should go on to hold discussions' is [to be] added here. That is, being desirous of acquiring 'superior knowledge' (*prajñā*) from others [viz. the preceptor etc.], by expressly indicating the desire for obtaining the knowledge of truth, and without making an effort to put forward his own viewpoint, a person [aspiring to liberation] should modify his own conclusions as well as the viewpoints of other philosophers (*prāvāduka*) which are opposed to one another.

Elucidation

It has been recommended (in *sūtra*-s 47-48) that an aspirant after liberation should hold discussions with the learned or other fit persons. An objection may be raised against it. While discussing a topic, the aspirant will adhere to his own viewpoint, and the other participant will stick to his own conclusion, and the one will try to refute the other. Thus the aspirant may grow attachment (*rāga*) for his own conclusion and aversion (*dveṣa*) for that of the other. Since however attachment and aversion only obstruct the attainment of liberation an aspirant should not engage himself in debates with others. In answer, Gautama states, in the present *sūtra*, that an aspirant, with the sole purpose of ascertaining the truth, may hold discussions with others without making any effort to put forward his own thesis.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON (THE MEANS FOR) THE ENHANCEMENT OF RIGHT KNOWLEDGE

(*tattvajñāna-vivṛddhi-prakaraṇa*)

VI. On the means for guarding right knowledge

Bhāṣya

There are persons who, due to [an excessive] fondness for their own thesis, transgress the rules of argumentation [i.e. try to refute the correct conclusions of others with faulty reasons]. In such cases—

Sūtra 50

Jalpa and *vitaṇḍā* are [to be employed] for protecting the ascertainment of truth, just as fences with thorny branches are constructed to protect the seedling coming out of the seed. // iv. 2.50 //

Bhāṣya

This *sūtra* is meant for those who are striving for the ascertainment of truth, but have not yet [firmly] acquired the knowledge of truth, and are not yet [completely] free from the evils [like attachment or aversion].

Elucidation

According to Gautama, *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* are conducive to the attainment of the final good (*niḥśreyasa*) in an indirect way ; they protect the ascertainment of truth which directly leads to the final good.

Vātsyāyana however says here that *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā* are to be employed for the purpose of defending attacks against the knowledge of truth by those who are not yet firm in their conviction of truth and the attachment or the aversion of whom has not yet been completely exhausted.

Bhāṣya

Moreover, when one [adhering to the true *vidyā*] is despised by another because of his disrespect etc. for the true *vidyā*—

Sūtra 51

One may start a debate 'by attacking' (*vigṛhya*) [the opponent] with the help of *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*. // iv. 2.51 //

Bhāṣya

The word *vigṛhya* implies that [in such cases] one is motivated by the desire for victory and not by the desire for the obtainment of knowledge of truth. This [debating with the help of *jalpa* and *vitaṇḍā*] again is for the purpose of the sustenance of true *vidyā* and not for the purposes of acquiring wealth, obtaining honour and earning fame.

Elucidation

According to some, the last *sūtra* is really a statement of Vātsyāyana. This is unacceptable because of two considerations. First, it has been accepted as a *sūtra* of Gautama by both Vācaspati Miśra and Viśvanātha. Secondly, if it is not accepted as a *sūtra* of Gautama, there will be left only one *sūtra* in the present section. This is however absurd, because a *prakaraṇa* can never consist of only one *sūtra*.

HERE ENDS THE SECTION ON THE MEANS FOR GUARDING RIGHT KNOWLEDGE

(*tattvajñāna-paripālana-prakaraṇa*)

SECOND *ĀHNIKA* OF THE FOURTH CHAPTER ENDS

LIST OF SŪTRA-S

In his introduction to the first volume of *Nyāyadarśana* Phaṇibhūṣaṇa mentions the difficulties he felt about the actual readings of the *sūtra*-s. He himself preferred, on the whole, to follow the readings of the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* of Vācaspati Miśra.

We give below the *sūtra*-s as occurring in Phaṇibhūṣaṇa's text, though for the purpose of easier understanding the compounded and conjoined words are shown separated by hyphenmarks. We also add, in the form of footnotes, the important variants of the *sūtra*-s as are found to occur in standard Nyāya works. For these variants and the references, we have drawn upon *Die Nyāyasūtra's Text, Uebrsetzung, Erlaeuterung und Glossar* by Professor Walter Ruben, published by Deutsche Morgenlandische Gesellschaft, Leipzig 1928.

Abbreviations used in the notes :

ASS : NS, Nbh and Nvr. Ānandāśrama Saṃskṛta Series 1922.

B : Ballentyne, The Aphorisms of the Nyāya Philosophy by Gautama, Allahabad 1850.

bibl. ind. : NS and Nbh. Bibliotheca Indica 1865.

Nbh : Nyāyabhāṣya of Vātsyāyana.

NM : Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa.

NS : Nyāyasūtra.

NSN : Nyāyacūcīnibandha of Vācaspati Miśra.

NV : Nyāyavārtika of Uddyotakara.

NVi : Nyāyavivaraṇa of Rādhāmohana Gosvāmin.

NVr : Nyāyasūtravṛtti of Viśvanātha. See ASS.

nvr : Nyāyasūtravṛtti. ed. 1828.

NVTT : Nyāyavartika-tātparyaṭīkā of Vācaspati.

R : NS with NVr. ed. by Rāmabhavana Śarmā. (This does not agree with the *bibl. ind.* or the *nvr* ed.)

Up. : Upaskāra of Śaṃkara Miśra. See VS.

V : Vidyabhusana's translation of NS, 1913.

VS : Vaiśeṣikadarśana with Praśastapāda-bhāṣya and Upaskāra. Kasi Sanskrit Series 1923.

VSS : NS with Nbh ed. Gangadhara Sastrin, Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, 1896.

iv. 2.1 / doṣa-nimittānāṃ tattva-jñānād ahaṃkāra-nivṛttiḥ.

iv. 2.2 / doṣa-nimittaṃ rūpādayo viṣayāḥ saṃkalpa-kṛtāḥ.

iv. 2.3 / tan-nimittaṁ tu avayavyabhimānaḥ.

iv. 2.4 / vidyā' vidyā-dvaibidhyāt saṃśayaḥ.

iv. 2.5 / tad-asaṁśayaḥ pūrva-hetu-prasiddhatvāt.

iv. 2.6 / vṛttyanupapatter api[1] na saṃśayaḥ.[2]

1. Some editions add *tarhi* after *api*.
2. NV, NVi, R, nvr and B : *saṃśaya-anupapattiḥ*.

iv. 2.7 / kṛtsna-ekadeśa-avṛttitvād avayavānāṃ avayavi-abhāvaḥ.

iv. 2.8 / teṣu ca avṛtter avayavi-abhāvaḥ.

iv. 2.9 / pṛthak ca avayavebhyaḥ avṛtteḥ.[1]

1. See under *Elucidation*.

iv. 2.10 / na ca avayavī avayavāḥ.

iv. 2.11 / ekasmin bheda-abhāvād bheda-śabda-prayoga-anupapatter apraśnaḥ.

iv. 2.12 / avayavāntara-bhāve[1] api avṛtter ahetuḥ.

1. VSS, ASS, NV, NSN, bibl. ind. and NVi : *abhāve*

iv. 2.13 / keśa-samūhe taimirika-upalabdhivat tad-upalabdhiḥ.

iv. 2.14 / sva-viṣaya-anatikrameṇa indriyasya paṭu-manda-bhāvād viṣaya-grahaṇasya tathā-bhāvaḥ, na aviṣaye pravṛttiḥ.[1]

1. nvr and B : *vṛttiḥ*. R : *avṛttiḥ* (?).

iv. 2.15 / avayava-avayavi-prasaṅgaḥ ca evam āpralayāt.

iv. 2.16 / na pralayaḥ aṇu-sadbhāvāt.

iv. 2.17 / paraṃ vā truṭeḥ.

iv. 2.18 / ākāśa-vyatibhedāt tad-anupapattiḥ.

iv. 2.19 / ākāśa-asarvagatatvaṃ vā.[1]

1. B omits *vā*.

iv. 2.20 / antar bahiḥ ca[1] kārya-dravyasya kāraṇāntara-vacanād akārye tad-abhāvaḥ.

1. B, nvr and NVi : *bahir iti*.

iv. 2.21 / śabda-saṃyoga[1]-vibhavāt ca sarvagatam.[2]

1. NV, VSS, bibl. ind. and V : *sarva-saṃyoga-śabda*. (See also under *Elucidation*).
2. Some read : *sarvagatatvam*.

iv. 2.22 / avyūha[1]-aviṣṭambha-vibhutvāni ca ākāśa-dharmāḥ.

1. NVi : *avyūhana*.

iv. 2.23 / mūrtimatāṃ ca saṃsthāna-upapatter[1] avayava-sadbhāvaḥ.

1. NVr : *utpatter*.

iv. 2.24 / saṃyoga-upapatteḥ ca.

iv. 2.25 / anavasthākāritvād anavasthā-anupapatteḥ ca apratiṣedhaḥ.

iv. 2.26 / buddhyā vivecanāt tu bhāvānāṃ yāthātmya-anupalabdhiḥ, tantu-apakarṣaṇe[1] paṭa-sadbhāva-anupalabdhivat tad-anupalabdhiḥ.[2]

1. NV : *apakarṣe*. NVi : *apakarṣaṇena*.
2. Omitted in B, nvr and NVi.

iv. 2.27 / vyāhatatvād ahetuḥ.

iv. 2.28 / tad-āśrayatvād a-pṛthag-grahaṇam.

iv. 2.29 / pramāṇataḥ ca artha-pratipatteḥ.

iv. 2.30 / pramāṇa-anupapatti-upapattibhyām.[1]

1. B, nvr, NVTT : *upapatti-anupapattibhyām*. R adds : *vyāghātāt ca*.

iv. 2.31 / svapna-viṣaya-abhimānavad ayaṃ pramāṇa-prameya-abhimānaḥ.

iv. 2.32 / māyā-gandharvanagara-mṛgatṛṣṇikāvad[1] vā.

1. R, B and nvr : *tṛṣṇāvat*. (See also under *Elucidation*.)

iv. 2.33 / hetu-abhāvād asiddhiḥ.

iv. 2.34 / smṛti-saṃkalpavat ca svapna-viṣaya-abhimānaḥ.[1]

1. NVi adds : *pūrva-upalabdha-viṣayaḥ* (=Nbh).

iv. 2.35 / mithyā-upalabdheḥ vināśaḥ tattvajñānāt, svapna-viṣaya-abhimāna-praṇāśavat pratibodhe.

iv. 2.36 / buddheḥ ca evaṃ nimitta-sadbhāva-upalambhāt.

iv. 2.37 / tattva-pradhāna-bhedāt ca mithyābuddheḥ dvaibidhya-upapattiḥ.

iv. 2.38 / samādhi-viśeṣa[1]-abhyāṣāt

1. NVTT : *tattva-*

iv. 2.39 / na, artha-viśeṣa-prābalyāt.

iv. 2.40 / kṣudādibhiḥ pravartanāt ca.

iv. 2.41 / pūrvakṛta-phala-anubandhāt tad-utpattiḥ.

iv. 2.42 / araṇya-guhā-pulinādiṣu yoga-abhyāsa-upadeśaḥ.[1]

1. B, nvr and VSS : *upadeśāt*. NVi : *upayogaḥ*. (See also under *Elucidation*.)

iv. 2.43 / apavarge api evam prasaṅgaḥ.

iv. 2.44 / na, niṣpanna-avaśyambhāvitvāt.

iv. 2.45 / tad-abhāvaḥ ca apavarge.[1]

1. VSS adds *tasya*.

iv. 2.46 / tadartham yama-niyamābhyām ātma-saṃskāraḥ, yogāt[1] ca adhyātma[2]-vidhi-upāyaiḥ.

1. NVi : *upayogāt*.
2. R, B and nvr : *ātma-*

iv. 2.47 / jñāna-grahaṇa-abhyāsaḥ tad-vidyaiḥ ca saha saṃvādaḥ.

iv. 2.48 / taṃ śiṣya-guru-sabrahmacāri-viśiṣṭa-śreyo'-rthibhiḥ anasūyibhiḥ abhyupeyāt.

iv. 2.49 / pratipakṣa-hīnam api vā prayojanārtham arthitve.

iv. 2.50 / tattva-adhyavasāya-saṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ jalpa-vitaṇḍe, bīja-praroha-saṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ kaṇṭaka-śākhā-āvaraṇavat.

iv. 2.51 / tābhyām vigṛhya kathanam.